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DEVELOPING INVESTMENT STORY DURING A CRISIS 
A case study 
 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of the study is to investigate how the case company Sonera developed its 
investment story during 1999–2002, at the course of the dot-com bubble and UMTS 
acquisitions. In addition, the research examines how the events that occurred in and among 
Sonera explain the changes in the investment story development. During the dot-com bubble 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, case Sonera was one of the most important and the most 
discussed events in Finland. The previous literature on investment story is mainly focused on 
textual analysis and the grounded theory based theoretical framework applied in this research 
has been built by examining companies under normal circumstances. 
 
DATA  
Data set consists of Sonera’s interim and year-end reports, newspaper articles and seven 
interviews. The interim and year-end reports, 14 in total, are collected from the second quarter 
of 1999 to the third quarter of 2002. The newspaper articles are collected from Finnish 
financial papers and the main newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, and the articles contain straight 
quotations from Sonera’s management considering the events taken place during 1999–2002. 
The interviews were conducted to five of Sonera’s managers, one analyst and one prior board 
member. All interviewees were working for or otherwise linked to Sonera at the time of the 
crisis.   
 
RESULTS  
The results show that the investment story can be investigated with the given framework 
despite the crisis environment. The results support the findings in previous literature. Each 
investment story component has an individual influence on the investment story and they can 
even mediate a contradictory story to the market. The event analysis shows that events chosen 
do have an impact on the investment story. Especially endogenous events create contradictory 
investment story. 
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SIJOITUSTARINAN KEHITTYMINEN KRIISISSÄ 
Case-tutkimus 
 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET  
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, miten Sonera sijoitustarina kehittyi IT-kuplan ja 
UMTS-kauppojen aikaan 1999–2002. Lisäksi tavoitteena on selvittää, miten Soneran 
ympäristössä ja yrityksessä tapahtuneet tapahtumat selittävät sijoitustarinan muutoksia. IT-
kuplan aikaan 1990-luvun lopussa ja 2000-luvun alussa Soneran UMTS-kaupat saivat 
Suomessa osakseen paljon huomiota julkisessa keskustelussa. Aiempi sijoitustarinaa koskeva 
kirjallisuus keskittyy pääasiassa tekstianalyysiin ja tämän tutkimuksen teoriakehyksen 
pohjana oleva teoria on rakennettu tutkimalla yrityksiä normaalissa tilassa.  
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO  
Aineisto koostuu Soneran osavuosikatsauksista, uutisartikkeleista sekä seitsemästä 
haastattelusta. Osavuosikatsauksissa, joita on yhteensä 14, on huomioitu raportit vuoden 1999 
toisesta kvartaalista vuoden 2002 kolmanteen kvartaaliin. Uutisartikkelit on kerätty 
suomalaisista talouslehdistä sekä Helsingin Sanomista ja ne sisältävät suoria lainauksia 
Soneran johdon puheista. Haastattelut koostuvat viidestä Soneran johtoon kuuluneen henkilön 
haastattelusta, yhdestä analyytikkohaastattelusta sekä yhdestä Soneran entisen hallituksen 
jäsenen haastattelusta.  
 
TULOKSET  
Tulokset tukevat aiempia tutkimustuloksia ja osoittavat, että kriisitilasta huolimatta 
sijoitustarinaa voidaan tutkia käyttämällä normaalitilan yrityksille muodostettua 
teoriakehystä. Sijoitustarinan komponenteilla on yksilölliset tehtävät sijoitustarinan 
rakentumisessa ja ne voivat välittää markkinoille ristiriitaista tarinan juonta. Tapahtuma-
analyysi osoittaa, että erityisesti yrityksen sisäisillä tapahtumilla on ristiriitainen vaikutus 
sijoitustarinan kulkuun. 
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1  Introduction  
1.1 Motivation 
“Bankruptcy of expectations.”  
 
Sonera’s share price development and UMTS operations were described with the quotation 
above in a Finnish financial magazine Talouselämä in April 2001 (Säntti 2001). The 
quotation does not only apply to Sonera but to the whole Internet and telecommunications 
sector during the turn of the new millennium. Internet boom had commenced in the USA in 
1995. Telecommunications industry fast began creating new products applying Internet 
technologies, especially 3G, Sonera being one of the most advanced companies in the world. 
(Vesterinen 2009.) However, the hype took its toll and in 2000, the bubble burst. Investors’ 
beliefs in the industry disappeared and the previously fast climbing share prices sank 
dramatically. Nevertheless, Sonera did not give up its strategic vision of being a 
“technologically advanced service provider specialized in telecommunications and data 
communication whose brands are internationally recognized”. (Sonera 1998–2001; Säntti 
2001.) 
 
To influence investor behaviour, companies create and update their communication strategy. 
Indeed, one of managers’ main concerns should be if the company’s communication strategy 
is effective in helping firm’s business strategy and thus support expected future performance. 
The management should also communicate the relevant risks in order to provide sufficient 
information for the analysts and public so that they will be able to reliably estimate the future 
potential of new investments. (Palepu et al. 2007, 508.) 
 
Not only does the communication strategy guide company’s disclosure activities. Listed 
companies are regulated by national and international legislation and guidelines that 
emphasize the shareholders’ information needs and demand for transparent and timely 
disclosure. (OECD 1999; AML.) Consequently, investors make their investment decisions 
based  on  information  they  receive  from  the  company  disclosures  and  the  analysts.  If  this  
information is too optimistic they are subject to false decisions. Thus, investors are dependent 
on information provided to them by the company and disclosed investment story has a crucial 
role  in  the  investment  decision.  Investment  story  is  a  written  description  of  the  company  
strategy and financial goals; how the company is positioned in the industry against its peers. 
??
?
The story’s main purpose is to make the company an attractive investment target. In order to 
provide the investors with sufficient and timely knowledge, the story needs to be updated. 
(Cole 2001; Ikäheimo & Mouritsen 2007; Virtanen 2010.)  
 
Investment story is a component of a longer chain of disclosure management process. 
According to Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992), it begins from the context in which the financial 
disclosure is produced. The disclosure is composed of factors both inside and outside the 
company and it creates opportunities and constraints on the final disclosure output. 
Management perceives the event, issue or circumstance that has requirements, opportunities 
and other implications. The managerial process is triggered by the disclosure event in relation 
to the context. The disclosure array then results from all three previous components. Previous 
research on this so-called context model has mainly been on the ritualism-opportunism aspect 
taken it into account as part of a larger quantitative model. (Rutherford 2005.) Previous 
research on the formation of investment story is, on the other hand, mainly focused on genre 
and textual analysis of annual reports and earnings press releases (see e.g. Jameson 2000; 
Henry 2008; Beattie et al. 2004; Rutherford 2005). Similarly with this thesis, Henry (2008) 
has conducted his research with companies from the telecommunications and IT industries 
during the IT boom. In addition, Ikäheimo & Mouritsen (2007) and Virtanen (2010) have 
been examining the elements of investment stories. Beattie et al. (2004) criticise the previous 
researches of taking into account only parts of disclosures and thus being narrow. Vesterinen 
(2009) and Sälli (2010) have used the same case example, i.e. Sonera and UMTS crisis, in 
their studies. Vesterinen (2009) took the point of view of the business environment’s 
influence on new innovations and Sälli (2010) was collecting evidence on the two-sided 
communication between the case company and the market. 
 
During the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s and early 2000s, case Sonera was one of the 
most important and the most discussed events in Finland. During the upturn, analysts gave 
positive and optimistic estimates and investors believed in Sonera. This can be seen from the 
analyst reports as well as from the exceptionally buoyant share price development after going 
public in November 1998. Consequently, until the share price began to dive, Sonera had 
provided the investors with a credible investment story, that is, solid rationale why Sonera 
was a profitable investment. During the dot-com bubble, the investor behaviour was extreme 
and differed in many ways from the investor behaviour in the stable market situation. Market 
value of publicly traded Internet companies rose and fell dramatically. (Valliere et al. 2004.)  
??
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In  Europe,  companies  were  investing  significant  amounts  in  UMTS  licences  and  new  
technological solutions. Besides in Finland, Sonera held also licences in four other countries. 
Especially the acquisition process in Germany made a splash in the media due to the 
extensive investment and write-off. Sonera invested solely in licences 4.1 billion euros. In 
addition, the licences obliged licence holders to invest significant amounts in additional fees. 
In the second quarter of 2002, Sonera wrote off 4.3 billion euros. Helsingin Sanomat and 
Kauppalehti wrote frequently about the company’s actions. The press was showing doubts on 
the licence competition thus influencing the general feeling in the stock market. In September 
2000, according to Helsingin Sanomat, the professionals of the telecommunications industry 
were starting to question the technological base of the UMTS network. No broad survey about 
the demand for the 3G networks had been conducted. Also, they expressed their opinion 
about the 3G being old when born. (Junkkari & Möttölä 2000; Junkkari 2000.) 
 
Being an important state-owned company, Sonera was under a great pressure from many 
directions. When the market realized that the expected future performance was about to fail 
they started adjusting the value of the company to a more suitable direction. Finally, they lost 
confidence almost completely. If the state of Finland had not been the major shareholder of 
Sonera, the company would have been facing bankruptcy. In 2001, Sonera introduced a new 
strategy limiting investments in UMTS projects, continuing divestments, and concentrating 
on profitability instead of growth. Finally, in 2002, Sonera merged with Swedish Telia. 
(Sonera 1999–2001.) 
 
1.2 Research goals  
The objective of this study, and the research question, is why and how did financial disclosure 
management develop Sonera’s investment story during 1999–2002. The research question is 
divided into two sub questions: 
1. How does Sonera’s investment story develop during 1999–2002? 
2. How the events that occurred during 1999–2002 explain the changes in the investment 
story development? 
 
This thesis is conducted using Sonera as a case company. The research takes the perspective 
of investor relations and seeks to find out how Sonera’s investment story was managed and 
how it developed over the period of the UMTS crisis. The research takes into account prior 
??
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(ex ante) and subsequent (ex post) interpretation management as factors of financial 
disclosure management. The theoretical framework is built on Gibbins, Richardson and 
Waterhouse’s (1990; 1992) model that takes into account the whole financial disclosure 
management process that is, the context to financial disclosure management, the disclosure 
management procedure and the final disclosure outputs. 
 
This thesis seeks to fill the gap in previous literature by applying the Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 
1992) model when examining the development of investment story in written case data. So far 
previous research on investment story has been concentrating on textual analysis under 
communications  studies.  The  goal  of  this  study  is  to  find  reasons  to  certain  disclosure  
characteristics by examining investment story in respect of its context. Investment story is 
composed of disclosure of strategy and financial goals, and is thus a financial disclosure 
management context factor according to Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992) model. Indeed, this thesis 
responds to a future research area pointed out by Gibbins et al. (1990): “specific disclosure 
actions may be taken, not because they directly communicate information to markets, but 
because they enhance or impair a firm's credibility and reputation”. Starting from disclosure 
output and its consequences this study examines the context driven factors’ relation to the 
extreme market reaction. In more detail, the basis of the research is the sudden change in 
investors’ confidence in Sonera during the UMTS licence acquisition process (consequence). 
By examining the written financial disclosure outputs the changes in Sonera’s investment 
story, i.e. disclosure on strategy, are identified and analysed.  
 
1.3 Research design, method and limitations 
This research is a qualitative, interpretive case study and it aims to interpret the information 
received from the interviews and written research material. The case study method allows to 
conduct a profound and in-depth research and thus to obtain a holistic picture of 
characteristics of this real-life event. In addition, a case study supports the convergence of 
evidence; simultaneous use of documents, observations, archival records and interviews that 
all together generate the fact (Yin 2003). As already stated, the research question will be 
examined using Sonera Oyj as a case company. Sonera was chosen because the UMTS crisis 
was a significant event in Finland during the IT bubble. 
 
??
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The research material consists of Sonera’s interim reports and year-end reports from the 
second quarter of 1999 to the third quarter of 2002, interviews of operating managers, a 
former member of Sonera’s board of director and an analyst from the time of the crisis, and 
newspaper articles containing interview quotes. Other researchers of the Department of 
Accounting have previously interviewed Sonera’s board members, operating managers, and 
analysts from the time of the crisis. In this research seven interviews are used. The interviews 
create a basis to the analysis of findings in the texts.  
 
The variables in this research are ex ante and ex post management. Ex ante management is 
examined through tone, time focus and causal statements in interim reports and year-end 
reports. Each paragraph is studied and the ones having some shading in tone and time are 
included in the sample. Causal statements are divided into two levels based on their in-depth 
analysis in the text, and to internal and external causal statements. Ex post management is 
examined from news in Helsingin Sanomat, Kauppalehti, Kauppalehti Optio, Taloussanomat 
and Talouselämä. Only the news containing straight interview quotations are included in the 
sample.  
 
Due to the subjectivity of the applied research method, even though an agreement level test is 
used, the results might be somewhat different if conducted by another researcher. Due to only 
one case company and phenomenon, the results of this thesis only provide understanding. 
Thus, the results are not generalizable. Also, this research was conducted with rather small 
case data that is, interim and year-end reports and news articles. The results would be even 
more descriptive or detailed if the data was larger, containing also stock exchange releases.  
 
1.4 Key concepts 
Investment story The written description of company strategy and 
financial goals. The objective of investment story is 
to convince investors about the attractiveness of the 
company as an investment. 
 
Financial disclosure management Financial disclosure management is the process the 
output of which is compulsory or voluntary financial 
??
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disclosure, that is, an annual or interim report, press 
release, or other disclosure on financial issues. 
 
Internet bubble Also referred to as the dot-com bubble. It started in 
the USA in the mid-1990s. Internet and 
telecommunications industries faced extreme stock 
price movements. When the market crashed the value 
of Internet companies sank dramatically and many 
small companies went bankrupt. In Finland, the 
bubble is mainly remembered for Sonera’s UMTS 
licence acquisitions in Germany. 
 
UMTS Abbreviation of the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System. UMTS is a third-
generation (3G) mobile communications technology 
that enables the usage of Internet via mobile phone. 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the previous literature first introducing 
more closely the concept of investment story, the means of financial disclosure, and the 
characteristics of financial disclosure during the dot-com bubble. Then, the context model on 
financial disclosure management is introduced. The literature review is concluded by forming 
the theoretical  framework of the study that combines the investment story and the Gibbins’s 
et al. (1990; 1992) model. Chapter 3 introduces the background to the case study as well as 
the contextual environment during the period under research. In addition to Sonera’s business 
environment and strategy, also hype as a phenomenon is briefly introduced to explain the 
context. Research data and method are reviewed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 introduces the 
research findings and analyses the development of the investment story in relation to 
disclosure and interview evidence. First, the development of individual investment story 
components is introduced. Then, the most important events discussed in the interviews are 
analysed in respect of their influence in the investment story. Chapter 6 discusses the research 
findings and Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
??
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2 Previous research on financial disclosure management and investment story 
Investment story is the corner stone of investor relations strategy. It is a tool to convince the 
investors that the company is worth investing and this way get company’s fair value and 
market value approach each other. In practice, investment story emerges and evolves through 
variety of written and oral financial disclosure. Financial disclosure management is thus in a 
central position when deciding the goal of disclosure. (Virtanen 2010; Palepu et al. 2007; 
Ikäheimo & Mouritsen 2007.) This chapter introduces the previous literature and research 
about financial disclosure management and investment story. In addition, the means of 
financial disclosure and basic features of financial disclosure during financial crisis at the turn 
of the new millennium, more specifically during the dot-com bubble, are introduced. 
 
2.1 Financial disclosure and investment story 
The definition of financial disclosure has been evolving over time. Gibbins et al. (1990, 1992) 
have presented two complementary and broad definitions. 
“Financial disclosure is any deliberate release of financial information, whether 
numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via formal or informal channels.” 
(Gibbins et al. 1990.)  
 
“Financial disclosure is the release outside the organization of information concerning 
the economic performance, position or prospects of the organization, particularly as 
measured in financial terms.” (Gibbins et al. 1992, 5.) 
 
Suijs (2007) complements these definitions by recognizing also the tight link between 
investment story and financial disclosure. 
“Disclosure then serves the purpose of attracting the investor’s capital away from the 
risk free asset.” (Suijs 2007.) 
 
As can be concluded from the definitions, what to disclose is a difficult choice for the 
management between protecting proprietary information and enhancing firm’s value by 
disclosing  as  much  as  possible.  Thus,  the  firm  needs  to  hold  on  to  its  business  secrets  that  
might  help  the  competitors  if  disclosed  at  the  same  time  with  disclosing  all  relevant  
information  to  the  investors  in  a  transparent  manner.  In  addition  to  the  question  what  to  
??
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disclose, the company also needs to decide under which circumstances it discloses voluntary 
information. (Palepu & Healy 1993; Cole 2001; Gibbins et al. 1990; Gibbins et al. 1992; Suijs 
2007.)  
 
2.1.1 Investment story as the plot of financial disclosure 
Previous research on investment story is mainly genre and other textual analysis under 
communications sciences rather than accounting. (E.g. Henry 2008; Jameson 2000; Beattie et 
al. 2004; Rutherford 2005.) Investment story serves as a plot in the disclosure answering to 
questions “how the company wants to be perceived by the investors” and “how the company 
sees  itself  as  an  investment”.  It  is  thus  a  written  description  of  the  company  strategy  and  
financial  goals  that  tell  what  the  company aims  at  in  the  near  future  and  whether  it  has  any  
financial figures guiding its operations. In addition, it comprises also possible risks. One of 
the most important aspects affecting the investor’s investment decision is how the company 
communicates its strategy implementation. Therefore, one essential task of the company’s IR 
function is to update the investment story. (Virtanen 2010; Cole 2001.) 
 
Due to its narrative and strategy based nature, investment story has no official form. It is to be 
built on a strategically strong and clear base. In other words, how the firm is able to tackle fast 
changes in the business environment. The investment story tells how the company stands out 
in the industry that is, unique features in its strategy, vision, and operations. The company 
management’s estimations about the future have a special emphasis when the present and the 
near future cannot predict the future. Strategic credibility is a concept meaning how 
favourably the key stakeholders view the company’s overall strategy and its strategic planning 
process. Strategic credibility might also provide competitive advantages to a company that 
efficiently discloses its strategic targets. (Higgins & Bannister 1992.) Indeed, the investors’ 
assessment of the company’s future potential depends on the analysis of company’s 
objectives and strategy against its past and expected performance. Hence, the investors are not 
only interested in the overall description of the “game plan” but also in specific moves. (Cole 
2001.) The credibility and the investor confidence are easily lost by too optimistic future 
prospects as well as by timely too late disclosure. Also, the fact that media, especially the 
financial press and news agencies, have an effect on the investors’ market behaviour is 
acknowledged. (Virtanen 2010; Cole 2001; Scholes & Clutterbuck 1998.) 
 
??
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In its IR strategy the company strives for disclosing in an open, transparent and honest 
manner in every situation, good or bad. (AML; Virtanen 2010; Palepu et al. 2007.) Narrative 
parts should be aligned with the numerical financial information in order to satisfy both 
investors’ information needs and regulatory requirements. Disclosure policy is written 
instructions about the procedures and guidelines the company follows in all disclosures. The 
policy should include, among others, instructions on how to disclose about crisis situations. 
The company needs to capture the main point of its strategy in the story in order to attract the 
investors  who  need  all  the  possible  information  to  make  the  best  investment  decision.  One  
possibility to classify investment story types is to divide them into growth, risk management 
and cash flow stories. Growth story emphasizes the growth of revenues and attracts investors 
who  regard  fast  growth  as  important.  Risk  management  story  emphasizes  the  qualities  of  a  
valuable company and is often chosen in situations where company is undervalued, book 
value  being  higher  than  market  value.  The  third  category  of  IR stories  is  a  cash  flow story,  
which emphasizes company’s ability to pay dividend to shareholders. (Virtanen 2010; Palepu 
et al. 2007; Rutherford 2005.)  
 
Company credibility and investment story are strongly linked. Good reputation helps the 
company  to  be  chosen  by  investors  and  thus  lower  its  cost  of  capital.  In  addition,  highly  
regarded companies are able to reassure investors and analysts about their credibility during 
times of low performance. Hence, in crisis situations good reputation serves as a cushion 
helping companies to recover from share price decline faster than companies with lower 
reputation. In addition to reputation of top management, company’s reputation relies heavily 
on detailed and realistic presentation of strategic plans. Because the company strategy faces 
changes and uncertainties the causal links between trends, intents, actions, and results need to 
be written down and disclosed. Disclosing comprehensive and precise information reduces 
these uncertainties. Also, presenting the implementation plans and periodic follow-ups is 
essential since they help investors evaluate the company against its competitive context. If the 
presentation is incomplete investors and analysts are not able to make sense of company’s 
strategic plans and environmental context and thus company’s fair value and market value 
rather diverge than approach each other. (Mazzola et al. 2006; Ikäheimo & Mouritsen 2007.) 
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2.1.2 Means of disclosure 
Various means of disclosure are valued differently among investors. At the time of the 
Internet bubble the main means of information for investors were communication with 
stockbrokers, the press, annual reports, reports by analysts and interim reports. Due to the 
fragmentation of financial markets, different shareholder groups demand for different type of 
information, which they gather from group specific information sources. (Ikäheimo 1996.) In 
addition to the actual media, the company makes choices about disclosing voluntary 
information. Holland (1998) discovered that, out of the main means of disclosure, especially 
periodic financial reports and result announcements include mainly mandatory information 
whereas in relationships and links with financial institutions, analysts and media mainly 
voluntary information is disclosed. After the 2000s, the Internet has established an essential 
position as a mediator of financial information. Internet financial reporting has new 
interactive and multimedia characteristics that encourage companies to disclose more 
information e.g. about social and environmental issues online than through conventional 
channels (Trabelsi et al. 2004).  
 
Annual report is one of the most followed publications building the foundation of information 
and investor decisions. Its perspective is the management’s perspective. In annual report, 
company management evaluates the past financial year from the perspective of the strategy. 
In addition, the annual report should include information on company’s values and principles 
behind actions. A separate strategy in action report adds value to the investment decision – it 
is important to document the changes in the company’s path. In order to influence the 
investors’ view of company’s fundamental value, the management can augment investors’ 
understanding of the company’s future prospects by providing them with focused and 
transparent discussion of business objectives and strategy. Consequently, the information 
itself  in  annual  report  is  not  new  to  investors  who  often  follow  also  other,  more  frequently  
disclosed, reports such as interim reports and stock exchange releases. When taking into 
account that annual report is published only once a year, its value may be underestimated. 
However, previous research has shown that financial statement information is mainly used by 
financial analysts. (Cole 2001; Virtanen 2010; Ikäheimo 1996.) 
 
The function of a stock exchange release is, among others, to support the communication of 
the company strategy. Through the releases, the investment story evolves and gains content of 
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practice. Information in stock exchange releases is timely and exact. In addition, previously 
disclosed information may be corrected via stock exchange releases. Investor should be able 
to form a coherent picture of the release’s importance on the company share price. Interim 
reports can be seen as one, strictly regulated, type of stock exchange release. From the 
investors’ point of view quarterly published interim reports provide timely and reliable 
information on company performance. Interim reports are mainly used by long-term 
investors. (Virtanen 2010; Ikäheimo 1996.) Ikäheimo (1996) found that small investors don’t 
put much emphasis on information provided by analysts who provide larger investors with 
basic information on the company. However, analysts are not seen as timely source of 
information.  
 
The market transforms the information it receives into actions. For shareholders, the overall 
atmosphere of the share market is important. The feeling and information on general 
economic conditions are usually received through press. In addition, the press reveals 
information on company’s actions on the share market. The press provides investors with 
timely, basic facts on individual companies, their financial performance, and company 
management. However, information retrieved from the press can also be seen as unreliable or 
subjective. (Ikäheimo 1996.) If the press does not have a strong influence on the investment 
story development, it is however a mediator of the general feeling. Regardless, some shading 
of information management may be mediated when the journalist quotes company 
management. 
 
2.1.3 Characteristics of financial disclosure during the dot-com bubble 
Company behaviour during the Internet bubble can be summed up with one term: herd 
behaviour. IT companies were adopting similar strategies according to the “follow the 
industry” mentality – also in disclosure behaviour. Telecom operators were all following the 
trend of investing in third-generation licences that accumulated enormous debt to companies 
involved. (Stienstra et al. 2004.) Strategic renewal actions include for example mergers and 
acquisitions, alliances and reorganizing business operations that should be introduced and 
followed actively in financial disclosure. However, companies rather did not discuss about 
M&A plans until the specific target was publicly announced. (Cole 2001; Virtanen 2010; 
Stienstra et al. 2004.) 
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Disclosure behaviour in Internet and telecommunications industry, i.e. new economy 
companies, differed from the disclosure behaviour of the old economy companies. Holland 
(2005) has identified that old economy companies tended to exercise secrecy in disclosing 
during the dot-com bubble. Companies did not want to disclose boost expectations in order to 
avoid rapid share price increase, which would finally be followed by big disappointments. 
This management behaviour is also called prior interpretation management. (Gibbins et al. 
1992.) In addition, old economy companies tended to develop Internet strategies to match the 
prevailing fashion. (Holland 2005.)  
 
Holland (2005) found that, during the dot-com bubble, Internet and telecommunications 
companies focused basically only on share market changes and portfolio actions as primary 
sources of information and ignored fundamental and value creation information. New 
economy companies were disclosing future prospects and expectations more freely. Holland 
(2005) also discovered that in telecommunications industry new market conditions led 
companies to focus narrowly on only one chosen strategic storyline,  mainly UMTS and 3G, 
relevant to the company. This then led to fast changing valuation and information needs as 
well as fast changing share price that are independent of company’s disclosure of actions. 
This  suggests  that  too  much  weight  was  placed  on  the  most  recent  data,  which  led  to  
overconfidence and overacting. According to Virtanen (2010), many stock exchange listed 
companies failed in managing the investor expectations during the IT-bubble when stating too 
optimistic and groundless future prospects. Miller (2009) emphasizes that overly optimistic 
disclosures were intentional and systematic in nature. Mazzola (et al. 2006) found when 
examining Telecom Italia’s reputation at the end of 1990s that the presentation of company’s 
strategic plans, its content and figures, contained serious discrepancies. This then affected 
negatively on company’s reputation and credibility in financial markets. 
 
There are two sides to overly optimistic forecasts. On one hand, overly optimistic long-term 
forecasts may be due to a natural tendency for managers to be optimistic in their business 
outlooks. Also, optimistic long-term forecasts are consistent with management incentives to 
maximize share prices by encouraging high market expectations of future earnings. On the 
other hand, Miller’s (2009) research evidence indicates that some managers were engaging in 
disclosure behaviour designed to intentionally influence their firm’s share price, often with 
the intention of increasing prices. These actions were conducted by modifying investment 
story.  Designed  disclosures  are  classified  as  opportunistic  that  is,  they  stand  to  benefit  
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management and current shareholders at the expense of other non-shareholder investors and 
other stakeholders. Indeed, management’s opportunistic disclosure behaviour can influence 
investors’ earnings expectations and share price, and thus strategic manipulation of 
judgements of investors is possible. A contradiction arises. Although opportunistic 
disclosures may be consistent with the objective of maximizing shareholder value, they are 
inconsistent with the objectives of broader theories of management responsibility that focus 
on maximizing benefits for all stakeholders and the public at large. (Miller 2009.)  
 
In the late 1990s companies tended to commence disclosing more voluntary information to 
keep the investors updated what comes to the fast changing business environment. A growing 
number of firms began reporting non-GAAP-based earnings measures 1  alongside with 
required GAAP earnings. Pro forma information is found more informative than GAAP 
earnings and together with GAAP reporting it increases the quality of GAAP disclosure. Even 
though the companies’ intention was to disclose more than required the regulators were 
concerned that the rapid growth and unregulated nature of non-GAAP disclosures would 
mislead investors. (Miller 2009.)  
 
Not only company’s disclosures but also newspapers had their share in the dot-com bubble. In 
the beginning, articles handled the new innovations and extremely high prices that were paid 
of the company shares and then, during the UMTS auctions, they focused on the sharp drop in 
market values of telecommunication companies after these auctions. (Van Damme 2002.) The 
press has a role of communicating the general feeling in the market. (Ikäheimo 1996.) This 
was  also  suggested  by  Kimmo  Sasi,  the  Minister  of  Transport,  in  Helsingin  Sanomat  
(Rantanen 2002) when he accused the press for heating up the conversation and thus creating 
the Sonera-hype. 
 
2.2 Financial disclosure management 
It is not only the choice of information provided and the nicely painted picture of the strategy 
that the company needs to take into consideration. Previous literature has identified 
differences in costs and benefits arising from disclosure among firms as well as to investors. 
Direct benefits to investors are, for example, improved risk sharing opportunities and 
                                               
1 generally referred to as ‘pro forma earnings’ 
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increased equity values. Disclosure may also increase firm profitability when disclosure to 
competing companies leads to mutually beneficial adjustments in production. In addition, 
more disclosure might result in closer monitoring of company management that reduces 
agency costs. On the other hand, disclosure might also raise costs. Direct costs include costs 
of information production and dissemination. Credibility increases costs in respect of auditing 
and creating credible signals or creating misleading information. Executive time and loss of 
management opportunities by spending time in communicative actions can be perceived 
costly to the company. In addition, regulatory environment triggers costly disclosure actions. 
(Gibbins et al. 1990; Gibbins et al. 1992; Palepu & Healy 2001, Holland 1998.) Higher 
company credibility can also be perceived as a benefit as suggested by Holland (1998).  
 
Financial disclosure management can be seen as stable and two-dimensional where the first 
dimension deals with uncritical acceptance of rules and norms and the second dimension with 
the propensity to seek firm-specific advantages. The managed attributes of financial 
disclosure include, for example, information content, timing, and interpretation. (Gibbins et 
al. 1990.) These attributes are introduced in Chapter 2.2.1 Disclosure output. Company 
management may disclose information both to influence its opportunities and threats, and to 
respond to disclosure of other companies. Responding to market reactions and to other 
disclosures  finally  results  in  two-way  communication,  which  then  defines  the  desired  and  
factual valuation of the company that is, the difference between firm’s market value and fair 
value. By experience the company then learns what and how to disclose in interaction with 
other market players. (Ikäheimo & Mouritsen 2007; Sälli 2010; Gibbins et al. 1993; Beyer 
2008.) In order to produce a disclosure output, an internal or external stimuli needs to appear. 
Hence, the disclosure output is a response to those stimuli and the nature of the output is their 
function. Disclosure choice is thus subject to reporting standards, stock exchange rules, 
corporate financial communication capabilities, confidentiality and competitive issues, as well 
as to internal culture of secrecy and tendency to opportunism. (Holland 2005.) 
 
The Gibbins’s (et al. 1990; 1992) model of financial disclosure management is a grounded 
theory of disclosure. The theoretical model is formed on the grounds of empirical evidence. 
The observations are categorized and coded in order to build a framework. The theory is 
criticized for being only poorly understood, albeit often cited. (Partington 2000.) The aim of 
the studies is to understand the broad drivers and components of public disclosure behaviour. 
(Holland 2005.) Grounded theory of disclosure has also been applied, for example, by 
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Holland and Stoner (1996) when examining voluntary corporate disclosure and Barker (1998) 
when examining market information in respect to stock market information flows.  
2.2.1 Disclosure output 
In order to disclose, the company management faces different stimuli. Figure 1 illustrates the 
stimuli/output function introduced by Gibbins et al. (1990) and later amended by Gibbins et 
al. (1992). It demonstrates how the disclosure outputs, or disclosure array, are formed and 
managed. The challenge is to form disclosures that are informative and less complicated since 
investors may consider disclosure too complex, which increases the information cost to 
investors, and thus investors do not use the information they receive in their decision-making. 
To conclude, output of financial disclosure management is a complex array of information 
and management activities. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.) Different means of disclosure outputs 
have already been introduced in Chapter 2.1.2 Means of financial disclosure. 
 
Figure 1. Stages of financial disclosure management  
This figure is a combined presentation of Gibbins’s et al. two models from 1990 and 1992. 
 
 
As can be identified from figure 1, the disclosure array is preceded by two phases: disclosure 
management context and disclosure management. Context includes antecedents, or 
environmental and internal factors whereas disclosure management is composed of disclosure 
position, issue, and norms and opportunities perceived by the management. Throughout the 
process, eight disclosure output components are managed (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992, 16–23):  
16?
?
1. Data organization and information set  
2. Data content 
3. Redundancy  
4. Timing 
5. Ex ante management  
6. Ex post management  
7. Medium  
8. Credibility  
 
Gibbins et al. (1990) examine these eight components in respect of ritualism and opportunism 
that are introduced in Chapter 2.2.3.1. Data organization means how information is presented 
in the disclosure. It is the organization, arrangement and classification of information. 
Information set refers to “set of pigeonholes for data, existing in advance and waiting to be 
filled”. This means that some information is placed on a standard format that exists in 
advance whereas some information is disclosed in freer format.  
 
Data content is the basic numbers and words disclosed. It is the raw data of the disclosure that 
is subject to management, for example to earnings management. Gibbins et al. (1990) state 
that managing this category may go beyond managing numerical content. The company 
management may arrange the business based on the desired disclosure outcome. For example, 
letter to shareholders, used by Gibbins et al. (1990), can vary in length and content. They used 
the data content in letters to shareholders as basis of their research material collection by 
analysing other output factors in respect of data content. (Gibbins et al. 1990.) 
 
Redundancy is selecting a subset of information for some recipients, releasing same 
information in more than one way or at more than one time. Redundancy implies that 
successive information releases, which reach the market through different media, may be 
serially dependent. Redundancy, however, does not signify disclosing inconsistent or false 
information to some recipients. For example, the company may use part of the interim report 
in  press  release  or  in  annual  report  and  use  the  previous  interim  report  as  the  basis  of  the  
second by only changing the text needing to be changed. (Gibbins et al. 1990; Gibbins et al. 
1992.)  
 
17?
?
Timing  refers  to  date  and  frequency  of  the  disclosure;  when  the  announcement  is  given  in  
respect of the event date. It is managing both the date and time of day as well as timing 
relative to other disclosure. Timing is calculated by calculating the days between the end of 
the  disclosure  period  and  the  date  of  disclosure.  Timing  and  timeliness  issues  are  widely  
examined in the fields of accounting and finance. For example, Gigler and Hemmer (2001) 
contribute to the timeliness research when studying the relations between financial reporting 
and manager’s incentives to issue timely voluntary disclosures. Gibbins et al. (1993), on the 
other hand, examine the timing in labour negotiations, especially in strike situations. They 
found that company’s disclosure activity was elevated during the strike periods. 
 
Ex ante management refers to all attempts by the discloser to manage interpretation and 
visibility of disclosure before the information is public; attempts to educate the user. The 
discloser may, for example, choose the data in order to achieve a desired interpretation. Ex 
ante interpretation management may take place for example management analyses and in 
face-to-face events where the discloser may observe and test the reactions and interpretation 
of information. In addition to the information itself, also the visibility of the disclosure may 
be influenced. Ex post management means the company management’s attempts to influence 
the users’ interpretation after the information is released, for example correcting news stories 
or suggesting to analysts that forecasts are inaccurate. It is another disclosure whose focus is 
on prior disclosure. Gibbins et al. (1990) found when examining shareholders’ letters that 61 
per cent of points had some positive or negative shading or explicit causal attribution. They 
also identify the firm-specificity and individuality in the ex ante and ex post interpretation as 
well as in timing. 
 
Variety of media is used to mediate the information to the public. The traditional media for 
disclosing financial information are annual reports, interim reports, and press and stock 
exchange releases. In addition to written media, companies disclose information for example 
through the Internet and through speeches, road shows, interviews and other public 
appearances. (Ikäheimo 1996.) Different media are introduced in Chapter 2.1.2.  
 
Credibility of the data is improved by involving senior executives or external mediators to the 
disclosure. Credibility refers also to the perceived quality of the disclosure. Even though 
credibility is in the eye of the reader, it can be managed. In addition to involving external 
mediators, the company can include different certificates (e.g. sustainability initiatives GRI or 
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United Nations’ Principles to Responsibility Investment PRI), slogans, and awards to create 
credibility to both the disclosure and the company. (Gibbins et al. 1992.) Credibility rests on 
company’s disclosure reputation. Credibility and company reputation are discussed in more 
detail in Chapters 2.1.1 and 2.1.3. 
 
2.2.2 Disclosure management context 
The first building block of disclosure management process is the disclosure management 
context that describes organization’s relationship to its environment. Context consists of 
economic environment, institutional environment, and disclosure subunit status. In the first of 
two models  of  Gibbins  et  al.  (1990)  context  was  named as  antecedents  that  are  internal  and  
external conditions.  
 
2.2.2.1 Institutional and economic environment 
External antecedents (in Gibbins et al. 1990) are comparable to institutional and economic 
environment (in Gibbins et al. 1992); they relate to institutional factors and to financial 
markets.  Institutional  environment  is  the  environment  in  which  the  disclosure  occurs  and  it  
refers to institutions as rules enabling and constraining interaction. These factors are for 
example legislation and regulations, industry norms for disclosure, and interorganizational 
networks where companies have agreed on sharing financial information. In addition to 
national laws, also OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) and Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code (2010), among others, concern corporate disclosure. Financial disclosure is 
thus seen as a communicative process that is embedded in a network of social relationships. 
(Gibbins et al. 1990, 1992.) 
 
Previous literature suggests that firms tend to mimic the innovators in the industry so that 
disclosure practices spread among a group in which all companies are linked by a common 
interest. Especially, this behaviour has been recognized when examining the IT-bubble. 
(Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001; Miller 2009; Cole 2001; Holland 2005.) Organization’s reaction 
to movements and changes in its institutional environment is strategic. Company adopts 
strategies that are a result of a complex interaction, a communication process, between the 
environment in which the company operates and the internal management process. As a 
conclusion, disclosure affects the company’s position in financial market and financial 
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disclosure affects the competitive position as already briefly discussed. The institutional 
environment emphasizes the financial environment where the disclosure occurs. (Gibbins et 
al. 1990, 1992.)  
 
Economic environment considers the above introduced cost/benefit aspect of financial 
disclosure. That is, in what situations the costs of disclosure exceed the benefits and non-
disclosure becomes more attractive, for example, when deciding about disclosing proprietary 
information. The complexity of economic environment suggests that different disclosure 
management opportunities exist. These different opportunities create cross-sectional 
implications on financial disclosure what comes to capital and industry structure, investment 
opportunities, and regulatory environment. Capital structure relates to raising capital and 
keeping the company in investors’ eyes. Depending on the level of proprietary costs the 
company can either disclose more on new projects and collect equity capital or disclose less 
and rely on debt and internal financing. However, regulators tend to increase the cost of non-
disclosure and thus set incentives to incur direct disclosure costs. As already acknowledged 
when discussing about institutional environment, industry structure influences through 
proprietary costs associated with competitors’ actions. In growth industries active disclosure 
is expected, for example in situations where the company has many profitable investment 
opportunities. (Palepu & Healy 1993; Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.) 
 
2.2.2.2 Disclosure Subunit Status  
External factors of disclosure management context are mainly explained through benefits and 
costs incurred as a result of disclosure decision. Internal factors, on the other hand, take into 
account also the personal characteristics of the management as well as the strategic decisions. 
Disclosure subunit status represents the organization structure’s influence on disclosure and 
seeks  answers  to  why  the  company  is  devoting  resources  to  disclosure  activities.  It  is  the  
firm’s capacity to manage disclosure not how the disclosure is managed. Aspects behind 
disclosure subunit status also referred to as internal antecedents, relate to traditions and 
consequences of previous disclosures. Traditions influence the way the disclosure is managed. 
Management also reflects the consequences of previous disclosures. In cases where the 
investor response to voluntary disclosure has been disadvantageous the company may choose 
not to disclose certain information due to uncertain responses. This suggests that disclosure 
management results in learning from previous actions. The disclosure subunit status is hence 
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formed in a process where every aspect either increases or diminishes the status. (Gibbins et 
al. 1992; Suijs 2007.)  
 
Disclosure subunit is a function of the organization, for example marketing, research and 
development or accounting. A subunit consists of experts, specialists having experience and 
training in disclosure, who identify and solve problems and thus have an influence on 
financial disclosure. Experienced specialists tend to see business problems as containing a 
disclosure  dimension.  Gibbins  et  al.  (1992,  61)  state  that  it  is  actually  the  specialists  in  the  
subunits who determine whether the company attends to disclosure management. However, 
since a company is an entity of several disclosure subunits it is challenging to identify the 
actual influence of one subunit on financial disclosure. This fact gives an explanation to why 
disclosure subunit status is rather the ability of one subunit to influence the behaviour of other 
subunits and consequently influence the organization’s disclosure outputs. (Gibbins et al. 
1992, 61.) The formation of disclosure subunit status is illustrated in figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. Formation of Disclosure Subunit Status  
Reference: Gibbins et al. 1992, 61 
 
 
As can be seen from figure 2, in addition to environmental factors, also chosen corporate 
strategy is an essential context factor that carries along disclosure norms. As previously 
stated, disclosure of business strategy is among investors’ top ten information needs. (Cole 
2001.) Corporate strategy is a product of complex interaction between company’s business 
environment and internal management process. Adapting to changes in business environment 
might  also  mean  a  need  to  reshape  the  strategy,  which  then  has  an  effect  on  disclosure  
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management. Hence, different strategic choices demand for different kind of information as 
well as different kind of disclosure. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.) Company strategy and 
disclosure are also linked what comes to the company size. Higgins and Bannister (1992) 
found that the more diversified the company the greater the need to convey strategy 
information to stakeholders. Evaluation of focused firms is more concentrated on financial 
and market measures on performance and risk. 
 
Internal characteristics introduced above and environment related context factors introduced 
in Chapter 2.2.2.1 are summed up under disclosure subunit status which, hence, completes the 
earlier framework introduced by Gibbins et al. (1990). Disclosure subunit status illustrates 
how the organization structure influences the disclosure output and it describes organization’s 
capacity to act on disclosure issues. Disclosure subunit status is thus composed of 
environment, strategy, and organizational conditions as can be identified from figure 2. 
Disclosure subunit being composed of specialists, the more disclosure involved specialists the 
higher the disclosure subunit status. (Gibbins et al. 1992.) 
 
Organizational conditions arise from corporate strategy and environmental factors. However, 
they can also influence the firm’s choices of strategy. Organizational conditions are divided 
into workflow salience, formal position and management characteristics. Taking the 
perspective of contingency theory2,  workflow  salience  is  composed  of  workflow  centrality,  
coping with uncertainty and non-substitutability and it is derived from the disclosure 
subunit’s involvement in production, financing, and operating decisions. Workflow centrality 
reflects the interconnections of different subunits and their activities. It is the extent to which 
disclosure issues, introduced in Chapter 2.2.3, are seen to be relevant to organization’s 
activities. Organizations face uncertainties what comes to economic or institutional factors 
and coping with them means whether disclosure activities are able to reduce this uncertainty 
about contingencies. In the changing business environment especially the strategy is subject 
to risks and uncertainties associated with forecasting the future conditions. The more the 
uncertainty is reduced the higher the workflow salience and thus also the higher the disclosure 
subunit status. Non-substitutability refers to whether the service can be provided through 
alternative means, e.g. outside experts, or whether non-disclosure mechanisms exist for 
                                               
2 Contingency theory suggests that there is no general and best organization structure or leadership style but they 
are shaped in relation to existing environmental conditions. Different leadership styles fit in different social 
relationships and structures.  
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dealing with important contingencies. Possibility to either use external mediators or not to 
disclose both decreases workflow salience and disclosure subunit status. (Cole 2001; Gibbins 
et al. 1992.) 
 
Formal  position  of  the  disclosure  activities  is  a  measure  of  internal  structure  and  it  includes  
the degree of formalization in job role descriptions, location of the disclosure subunit in the 
organization’s authority structure and personal characteristics. Internal structure is based on 
policies and procedures about how the responsibility of the disclosure management is 
assigned and guided in the company. Degree of formalization in job role description reflects 
the organizational structure and is the degree to which rules and procedures are explicitly 
formulated. The disclosure subunit status increases to the extent that it legitimates disclosure-
oriented roles and implies a long-term commitment to such positions. Formalization decreases 
status to the extent that it decreases adaptability and creates rigidities that interfere with 
needed response to change. The perspective of location means those who hold the 
responsibility and how close or far in the organization those specialists are. The greater the 
disclosure subunit's formal authority, the greater the status. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.) 
 
Personal characteristics refer to the management of the subunit. The goals and ambitions of 
the management are at stake. Talented individuals may, for example, seek out opportunities to 
provide services to the organization that less able leaders would not. Internal policies, and 
thus also the disclosure output, reflect the managements’ and especially CEO’s attitudes. 
(Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.)  
 
2.2.3 Disclosure management 
Disclosure management is the phase where decisions concerning the actual information 
management take place. Gibbins et al. (1992) divide disclosure management into disclosure 
position, or predisposition, and disclosure issue. Disclosure management is based on 
disclosure management context introduced in previous chapters. Economic and institutional 
environments entail behavioural opportunities that organizations act on with help of 
disclosure subunit status. The behaviour and response chosen then depend on company’s 
disclosure position. Disclosure issue, on the other hand, is the stimulus for disclosing arising 
either inside or outside the company. (Gibbins et al. 1990.) 
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2.2.3.1 Disclosure position 
Disclosure position determines the company’s expected response to a disclosure issue under 
normal  circumstances  and  has  thus  a  strong  effect  on  disclosure  outputs.  It  is  a  “relatively 
stable preference for the way the disclosure is managed” (Gibbins et al. 1990, 130). 
Organizational factors like history, financial performance, personality and preference of CEO, 
size and extent of internal agreement influence the disclosure position. The change in the 
relations between these context factors changes also the firm’s disclosure position. (Gibbins et 
al. 1990, 1992.) 
 
Gibbins (et al. 1990) divides disclosure position into ritualism and opportunism that reflect 
external and internal antecedents, or financial disclosure context factors. Company’s formal 
structure establishes routines for identifying and reacting to disclosure issues. Both ritualism 
and opportunism, even though distinct in respect of certain disclosure, are managerial 
predispositions to behave in a particular way. Ritualism refers to a rather passive attitude and 
established and bureaucratic procedures. Industry norms and disclosure are adhered without 
criticism and the disclosure issue is reacted to passively and repetitively. Thus, when external 
norms exist the company is more likely to behave ritualistically. (Trabelsi et al. 2004; Gibbins 
et al. 1990; 1992; Henry 2008.) 
 
Opportunism is defined as seeking firm-specific advantages in the disclosure of financial 
information. (Gibbins et al. 1990.) This means, for example, that the management works 
actively the company’s or specific interest group’s interest in mind even though the 
predispositions would guide them to behave in a certain way. Opportunistic disclosure 
strategy might be in relation to management’s share price based incentives. However 
perceived as unethical, through strategic manipulation of investors’ judgements, which 
encourages high market expectations, the share price can be maximized. (Miller 2009.) 
Gibbins et al. (1990) found that the more the company is dependent on the capital market the 
more opportunistically in behaves. Feedback from the capital market also results in learning 
and eventually in changing disclosure position. (Holland 2005.) Graham et al. (2006) argue 
that learning from market reactions might also result in avoiding negative market reactions.  
In addition, the concept of corporate disclosure position or strategy offers considerable 
potential for explaining voluntary financial disclosure that was recognized as characteristic to 
new economy companies during the dot-com era. This is due to the attempt to diminish the 
cost of searching for information that incurs to investors. Voluntary information is thus 
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disclosed in order to enhance the information available to investors and reduce the incurring 
cost. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.)  
 
2.2.3.2 Disclosure issue 
Alongside with the disclosure position, disclosure issue as well as perceived and defined 
norms and opportunities influence the disclosure output. Disclosure issue is an internal 
stimulus for disclosure and perceived by the company management. Disclosure management 
context factors introduced in Chapter 2.2.2 have a strong influence on the perception. 
Perceived opportunities define the benefits and costs that the management believes are 
associated with specific disclosure issue. In some cases the management might have an 
incentive to disclose more voluntary information whereas in other cases the risk of 
unfavourable response by investors is too high and thus leads to non-disclosure. (Gibbins et 
al. 1990; Gibbins et al. 1992; Suijs 2007.) 
 
In previous literature disclosure issues are divided into two: continuous and periodic issues. 
Continuous disclosure issues arise from on-going everyday activities and when perceived they 
result in disclosure at any time during the financial year. Disclosures in question are for 
example stock exchange releases that are to disclose when significant events occur. Periodic 
disclosure issues, on the other hand, are routinized and arise with the passage of time. 
Periodic disclosures lead, for example, to quarterly and annual earnings announcements. 
(Gibbins et al. 1992.) 
 
Disclosure management is interaction between disclosure position and disclosure issue. 
Opportunities perceived by the management relate strongly with opportunistic disclosure 
position whereas perceived presence of external norms activates the ritualistic thinking. For 
example, filing a prospectus is strictly regulated what comes to timing, content, and media. 
Earnings forecasts, on the other hand, follow both external and internal norms. According to 
Gibbins et al. (1992) disclosure opportunities refer to economic context that includes also 
positioning in product markets. Whether the opportunities are perceived depends on the 
disclosure position and on the strength of the economic stimuli. Companies have a possibility 
to  exploit  external  mediators  in  identifying  disclosure  issues  as  well  as  related  norms  and  
opportunities. External mediators encompass consultants, advisors and auditors who also 
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provide help to identifying laws and regulations associated with a particular disclosure in 
order to add disclosure’s credibility. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992, 73; Suijs 2007.) 
 
Gibbins (et al. 1990) found that information set that is, the standard format, is larger for 
opportunistic firms whereas ritualistic companies’ disclosure outputs are more descriptive and 
more time neutral than those of opportunistic firms. However, opportunistic companies tend 
to release earnings news quicker than ritualistic companies.  
 
2.3 Theoretical framework to analysing investment story through financial disclosure  
As can be concluded from the definitions, financial disclosure is a release of financial 
information outside the organization concerning economic performance, position or prospect 
of the organization as measured in financial terms. The purpose of the disclosure is to attract 
investors. Investment story, on the other hand, is the communicated company strategy and 
financial goals. The story type can be, among others, a growth story, a risk management story, 
or a cash-flow story and it aims to mediating the desired picture of the company to current 
and potential investors. Investment story should answer to questions “how do we want to be 
perceived by investors” and “how do we see ourselves as investment”. (Virtanen 2010.) 
 
Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992) theoretical framework of financial disclosure management 
consists of three components: disclosure management context, disclosure management, and 
disclosure array. The model has been built based on research material observations and 
instead of forming a theory it aims at illustrating how different theoretical perspectives help to 
organize the concept of managing financial disclosure. Due to the grounded theory base the 
amendments to the theory are rather difficult to directly place to the old model. Indeed, the 
model has some overlaps. For example learning, which is a consequence of opportunistic 
disclosure behaviour, is present in both, financial disclosure management context and 
financial disclosure management. Figure 3 gathers together the disclosure management model 
and building process of investment story as introduced in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 3. Building investment story  
This  figure  presents  the  building  process  of  the  investment  story  according  to  the  Gibbins’s  et  al.  
(1990; 1992) model. 
 
 
According to the definition, investment story is composed of how company strategy and 
financial goals are written out in different disclosures and presentations. Company strategy is 
included in disclosure subunit status thus being a disclosure management context factor. 
Company strategy and learning from previous disclosures forms the company’s disclosure 
strategy that is also part of the disclosure management context. The company management is 
responding to different disclosure issues based on its disclosure position. This is where the 
financial disclosure management takes place. Investment story is based on the company’s 
disclosure strategy. Eight disclosure factors, which can be observed from the outputs, are 
managed: data organization, data content, redundancy, timing, ex ante and ex post 
management, medium and credibility. Especially ex ante and ex post management can be seen 
as  significant  factors  when  examining  investment  story.  Ex  ante  and  ex  post  interpretation  
management are meant to affect the way the company is perceived by the investors. Ex ante 
management attempts to influence the readers’ interpretation before the disclosure is out in 
the public. Ex post management, on the other hand, occurs after the disclosure has been 
published and is, for example, stock exchange or news releases solely referring to a previous 
release correcting it. Investment story is the storyline of the company’s strategy and goals and 
is thus the final disclosure output. 
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To conclude, credibility is central to effective disclosure since investors make their decisions 
based on that information. Building reputation requires consistency in behaviour within the 
organization and through time as well as capacity to simultaneously address coexisting 
pressures for continuous growth through value creating innovations and successful strategic 
practices. The reputation can be enhanced by clearly articulated internal policies and by 
establishing organizational rules and procedures to manage disclosure. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 
Mazzola et al. 2006.) 
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3 Background of the case example and research context 
In order to understand the speciality of the business environment of the telecommunications 
industry in Finland during 1999–2002, it is important to introduce the special features of the 
period under review. This chapter provides descriptions of the business environment and 
essential events from the time of the UMTS crisis. The business environment is characterized 
by the liberalization of the industry that culminated to extreme market conditions. In case 
Sonera the hype was shown in rapid creation of new services and conquering new markets. 
Finally, the UMTS licence acquisition process ended in extensive write-offs.  
 
3.1 From liberalization of the telecommunications industry to UMTS auctions 
The origin of the dot-com bubble can be identified to the launching of Internet browser 
company Netscape’s IPO in August 1995 in the USA. Telecommunications Competition and 
Deregulation Act (S.652, 104th Cong. § 3, 1995) enacted in the United States in 1996, 
followed by the Telecommunications Directive of 1997 in the EU (96/193), launched the 
privatization and liberalization process in the western world. In European Union, the 
telecommunications market liberalized in the beginning of 1998 even though the European 
Court of Justice had included the telecommunications industry in the orbit of competition 
rules. Right from the beginning the industry was showing signs of competition as well as urge 
to develop new innovative products. Deregulation and the possibility to international 
operations led to major mergers and alliances in both Europe and the United States, which 
then became the prevailing trend. Finland’s telecommunications market commenced opening 
to competition stage by stage in 1987, which was an essential factor in developing the 
domestic market. In Finland, the deregulation had already taken place in 1994 that is, four 
years earlier than in the rest of Europe. (Vesterinen 2009; Stienstra et al. 2004; Sonera 1998; 
Sonera 1999; Mayer-Schönberger & Strasser 1999.) 
 
Due to early deregulation of telecommunications market in Finland, the development was 
already fast and Finland was a leader in mobile phone and Internet penetration rates during 
the late 1990s. Globally, the market leaders were the companies who learned fast the new 
rules of the game. New service development created competitive advantages to Sonera and 
                                               
3 Amending Commission Directive 90/388/EEC 
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other telecommunications companies in Finland and the expertise was spread around the 
world in forms of minority shareholdings and partnerships. Sonera’s mobile phone 
penetration rates were rising in all of its market areas and the mobile phone was becoming a 
personal tool for also other functions than calling and sending text messages. Internet was a 
key concept and phones were expected to be used, for example, as bank, cash, source of 
information, and entertainment. (Sonera 1999; Vesterinen 2009; Thrift 2001.)  
 “We were operating on an advantageous test market where new innovations kept on 
arising, and where all the equipment manufacturers were interested in being involved 
and developing new. And Finland is, even now, a nice market to test new innovations 
because it’s not too expensive.” (Interviewee D, manager) 
 
As already mentioned, the liberalization included also privatization of incumbent state-owned 
operators. Sonera, previously Telecom Finland, was fully state-owned until 1998. On July 1, 
1998 Sonera and Post of Finland became independent companies and Sonera was introduced 
to the stock exchange. Sonera’s shares have been quoted in the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(NASDAQ OMX Helsinki) since November 1998 and in NASDAQ (technology list) between 
1999 and 2004. The Finnish State sold to the public 22.2% of Sonera’s shares and the state 
holding fell  to 77.8%. Trading of the shares commenced on the Main List  on November 17, 
1998. In 1999, the State again sold Sonera’s shares and the holding fell to 57.9%. In 2000, the 
State organized two share issuances and one issuance of bonus shares that left the State with 
52.8 per cent holding of Sonera. 
“In the prospectus the state pledged to give up its major shareholding as fast as 
possible and that was an essential fact raised during the road show around the world.” 
(Interviewee D, manager) 
 
3.2 UMTS licence competition 
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telephone System) is the third generation broadband mobile 
communications standard that draws mobile communications and Internet content services 
closer  together.  It  is  considered  to  be  a  European  innovation.  UMTS  network  enables  the  
browsing of Internet pages with a mobile phone as well as the transmission of video image. 
Thus, it made developing of new services possible and as is stated in Sonera’s (1998) annual 
report “the use of mobile phones will thus gain decisively in diversity compared with their 
present role of transmitting voice and text-based services”. Since the market demanded for 
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more capacity, the 3G mobile network was a direct answer to consumers’ needs. (Sonera 
1998; 2000.) 
 
At the end of 1998 Finland’s Ministry of Transport and Communications, becoming the first 
ministry in the world to take this step, invited applications for UMTS network licences. In 
January 1999, Sonera then submitted two applications for licences to operate nationwide and 
regionally. Finally in March 1999, the Finnish Government granted Sonera a licence for a 
UMTS based 3G national mobile network according to the applications. Sonera was to utilize 
its existing mobile networks in building the new network. The network became operational 
stage-by-stage beginning in 2002 and it strengthened Sonera’s market position also bringing 
more responsibilities. (Sonera 1998; 1999.) 
 
In addition to national operations, Sonera was in the vanguard of international development 
work on the new mobile communications systems. According to its strategy, Sonera was 
working in cooperation with other telecommunications operators and service producers. Due 
to Internet being delivered as part of the mobile network via content and service providers, the 
owner of a network licence occupied a strong position. The cooperation relations opened new 
sources of revenues to the operators compared to previous solely customer invoicing based 
revenues. Sonera was seeking new sources of revenue for example from the interface between 
service and content providers. Often, the operator itself set up as a service provider. This was 
called the European approach to UMTS network and its prime elements were quality of 
service, the extent of the network and a high level of mobility. However, during 2000, UMTS 
standard reinforced its position as a worldwide standard especially in the United States. 
(Sonera 1998–2000.) What comes to disclosure, Higgins and Bannister (1992) suggest that 
when the company becomes more diversified it should also increase disclosure on strategic 
issues in order to provide enough information to investors. 
 
In 2000, European countries began granting third generation mobile network licences. The 
selection process was based either on an auction or on a beauty contest. Nordic countries and 
Spain, in particular, were using the beauty contest to award the licences. Van Damme (2002) 
suggests that for these countries generating revenue was not a goal but to establish a 
competitive telecommunications market as well as provide citizens with new network and 
provide companies with new development and growth possibilities. Also, the auctions were 
thought to increase consumer prices and delay innovation, which created some reservations to 
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the European Council. The countries using auctions were having confidence on their 
efficiency properties. (Van Damme 2002; Sonera 2000.) 
 
As a part of consortia, Sonera achieved its UMTS licence objectives in 2000 when it obtained 
licences in Germany and Italy in an auction. Other two licences were a result of beauty 
contests. All in all, Sonera obtained in total four licences in Germany, Spain, Italy and 
Norway covering more than 180 million people. In addition, in Sweden and Portugal Sonera 
was part of consortia, which did not obtain a licence, and in Great Britain the consortium in 
which Sonera participated withdrew from the auction. Sonera’s shareholding in different 
consortia, UMTS licence obtaining date and investments are presented below in Table 1. 
Total licence price comprises the licence price for the consortia. (Sonera 2000.) 
 
Table 1. Sonera in consortia  
This table indicates the different consortia Sonera participated when acquiring UMTS licences. (Sonera 2000, 
21) 
  
Country Consortia 
Sonera’s 
share Total licence price (€)  
Licence 
obtained 
Spain Xfera Móviles with 
Vivendi of France and 
Spain’s ACS 
14.25% 130 MEUR Beauty contest, 
March 2000 
Germany Group 3G with Spanish 
Telefónica 
42.8% 8 470 MEUR Auction, 
August 2000 
Italy Ipse 2000 with Telefónica 12.55% 3 260 MEUR Auction, 
October 2000 
Norway Broadband Mobile ASA 
with Norwegian Entel 
50.00% 25 MEUR Beauty contest, 
November 2000 
 
In some countries, after receiving licences the consortium companies established licence 
holding companies. For example in Italy, Ipse 2000 consortium established the Ipse 2000 
S.p.A shares of which all joint venture companies subscribed in relation to their share in the 
consortium. (Sonera 2000.) 
 
UMTS licences and the consolidation within the industry enabled Sonera to expand its market 
area and thus increase the distribution of its services. In line with its strategy, Sonera moved 
ahead in 2000 with the internationalization of its new services, such as the mobile portal Zed 
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and its electronic directory business. During 2000, Sonera paid about 4 billion euros of 
licence fees allowing the company, in cooperation with its partners, to stake out a significant 
position in Western Europe. The company was keen on making internationally most of the 
experience it had gained in the Finnish market. Despite the refusal of licence application in 
Sweden, Sonera was exploring alternative ways of operating in Sweden. (Sonera 2000.) 
 
As previously presented, telecommunications operators followed the general industry 
example of investing in expensive third-generation licences causing many operators in Europe 
to burden themselves with substantial debt. To reduce this debt the incumbent operators had 
to restructure both the organization and the business model. Sonera began investing in the 
new technology in Finland in 2000 and the annual investments were estimated to remain at 
some EUR 180 million. (Sonera 1999, 2001; Stienstra et al. 2004.) Sonera’s investments to 
other licence holding joint ventures are presented in Table 1. 
 
In 2001, the business environment changed to which Sonera’s management needed to adapt 
quickly. Sonera began down scaling its service businesses to improve profitability and the 
company put a cap on the maximum amount of future investments in UMTS projects in 
Germany, Spain and Italy limiting them solely to contractual obligations. However, despite 
the downturn, the first intercontinental UMTS call was made on November 15, 2001 between 
the Minister of Transport and Communications Olli-Pekka Heinonen, in Tokyo, and Anni 
Vepsäläinen, the head of Sonera Mobile Operations, in Helsinki. Finally, in January 2002, 
Sonera opened its Finnish 3G UMTS network to test use in accordance with the licence 
conditions. (Sonera 2001.) 
 
Whether the UMTS was good or not has been widely discussed especially in the press. 
Sonera’s president at the time, Kaj-Erik Relander, suggests that UMTS licence auctions and 
beauty contests have led to a higher market entry threshold. (Sonera 2000.) The UMTS 
“game” was being played during 2000 in many countries and the companies learned how to 
play better. In the beginning, the companies were working as individuals and finally the 
market was led by consortia. The companies realized that in auctions it was better to 
cooperate to achieve success. (Van Damme 2002.) 
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3.3 The New Economy 
The prevailing market situation during the time period under review can be described with 
one word: hype. Also called the new economy, it emphasizes the role of Internet and 
technology. (Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001.) Dahlgren and Hørlück (2001) explain the rapid rise 
and fall of the stock prices through three factors: money, hype, and interest. Investors were 
investing large amounts of money to the bullish market, especially to companies belonging to 
the Internet and TMT (technology, media, telecom) sector feeding the hype. Also, general 
public adopted Internet and telecommunication technology at an impressive speed. 
 
In Finland, Sonera was introducing many new technologies feeding the hype. According to 
the interviewees, hype starts from inside the company when the company starts bringing out 
new innovations: 
“Everyone was just thinking that there aren’t any limits in applying the new 
technology” (Interviewee E, board member) 
 
“Hype […] doesn’t work unless you have many interested bidders” (Interviewee C, 
manager) 
 
“It happens so that […] I’ll take three people from the street and say to the first one 
that this object is unique. And he’ll bid 5 euros. Then I’ll take the next person and say 
that someone already offered € 5 and that this is unique. That you’d have all rights to 
this product. He might bid € 6. I’d manage this circus 'cause I can’t make him bid of 
billions of euros. You just can’t get that price. You’ll take delegations, you’ll make 
business plans, and then you’ll see…” (Interviewee C, manager) 
 
During bullish hype led market situation in the late 1990s, investor behaviour was challenging 
to forecast and both investors and companies were showing signs of herd behaviour. 
(Stienstra et al. 2004; Fenn & Raskino 2008, 29.) However, telecommunications industry 
being  only  one  segment  of  the  Internet  and  TMT sector  it  did  not  face  as  rough changes  in  
stock valuation as companies in vaster Internet industry. Internationally, the volatility was the 
highest among Internet shares. (Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001.)  
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Hype can also be explained using a framework, hype curve introduced by Gartner Group (see 
e.g. Fenn & Raskino 2008; Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001; Ruef & Markard 2010) that can be 
found in figure 3. Hype cycle describes the market reactions when a new innovation is 
introduced. Thus, it reflects different responses to an innovation. Hype curve is composed of 
the hype-driven expectations, enthusiasm and disappointment (bell curve) and the maturity of 
innovation  that  is,  how  the  performance  improves  slowly  (S  curve).  Thus,  the  hype  cycle  
arises from two factors: human nature and the nature of innovation. Even though the hype 
curve describes expectations, Internet stock valuation in the late 1990s has been identified 
having similar characteristics with the curve. (Coltman et al. 2001; Fenn & Raskino 2008, 25–
26.) This same share price development curve applies also to Sonera whose share price curve 
is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 4. Hype curve  
Reference: Fenn & Raskino 2008 
 
 
The hype starts from unawareness, proceeds to curiosity and excitement until it reaches the 
extreme hype. Introduction of new innovation, whether a written plan or a draft model, 
triggers a period of inflated expectation. During the hype upturn, the market’s interest is 
focused on positive aspects of the innovation. These aspects are seen as overwhelming and 
revolutionary possibilities to change business practices and the society. The rapid excitement 
is followed by rapid disillusionment neither one of which matches the current reality of what 
the innovation can do. After March 2000, when the hype began to wane, the focus transferred 
to negative aspects and shortcomings, for example to mistakes made by managers and 
analysts. Finally, Internet, telecom, media and technology companies started to collapse. 
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Dahlgren and Hørlück (2001) state that during the upturn phase of the dot-com bubble the 
market disregarded analysts’ warnings. When the Internet stock finally crashed the Internet 
enthusiasts lost their credibility. Where the upturn was hyped, also the pessimism of 2001 was 
an overreaction. Finally, the audience’s reactions settle down and understanding of the 
innovation evolves the confidence and adoption grow and finally the market starts recovering 
growing through the slope of enlightenment to plateau of productivity. (Coltman et al. 2001; 
Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001; Fenn & Raskino 2008, 25.)  
 
Interviewee G named volatility and credibility as crucial factors pushing down the market 
price: 
“If it goes too far, the way that a too optimistic picture of the company is perceived and 
its value and we notice later that these promises can’t be expected, the share prices will 
fall. The value comes down. (Interviewee G, analyst) 
 
“If the market feels that the picture of the company is clearly a bit too optimistic and 
the one drawing the picture, there is a slight problem of confidence. And after, 
communicating the fair value might get more difficult. Because if you don’t trust 
anymore in what is being pictured, even though you would be as optimistic as possible 
when telling the fair value, the market doesn’t buy it.” (Interviewee G, analyst) 
 
Internationally, the dot-com bubble’s hype cycle lasted five to six years. However, for 
example WAP-based mobile commerce innovations went through the whole hype cycle in 
only 18 to 24 months. (Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001, Sonera 1999–2002.) Since mid-year 2000 
when the market blunted the Dow Jones European telecom index lost two-thirds of its value. 
Investors began selling shares when they perceived the new technology companies’ shares 
becoming illiquid. Despite the crash, Internet usage continued to grow strongly throughout 
the world and traditional telecom companies began developing applications for Web 
technology. (Sonera 2000–2001; Coltman et al. 2001, van Damme 2002, Vesterinen 2009.)  
 
3.4 Sonera’s strategy 1998–2002 
This chapter introduced Sonera’s strategy as it was written out in the annual reports during the 
period of 1998–2002. The strategic targets from 1998 to 2001 can be seen in Table 2. In 1998, 
at the year of going public, Sonera’s strategic objective was to develop its leader position in 
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Finland and to leverage the expertise obtained in international operations in selected areas. 
Being the premier provider of mobile, data and media communications services it had set its 
financial targets high. In the period of three to five years the revenue growth target amounted 
to 10 per cent. In addition, Sonera had set the minimum level of profit from international 
operations to one third. Other financial targets were return on investment ratio bigger than 15 
per cent, equity-to-assets over 40 per cent and net debt-to-capital ratio less than 50 per cent. 
Dividend pay-out ratio was set to one fourth of net income. (Sonera 1998.) 
 
Table 2. Sonera’s strategic goals according to the annual reports 
This table indicates the development of Sonera’s strategy on a yearly basis according to strategic themes.  
 
Strategic theme 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Market position  
 
Developing role within 
Finnish market 
 
Strengthening position 
in Finland 
 
Maintaining position in 
domestic fixed network 
services 
Maintaining a strong 
market position in 
Finland 
 
Strengthen leadership 
within mobile 
communications 
Present 2G operations 
will be expanded further 
 
Growth Expanding portfolio of 
international 
investments 
International growth 
within mobile 
communications 
Sonera will participate 
in the on-going 
consolidation process to 
ensure scale economies 
 
3G operations will be 
launched in Europe 
Continued organic 
growth 
 
Maintaining growth 
opportunities 
Profitability    Restructured 
balance sheet 
Sharply improved 
profitability 
Services Developing innovative 
mobile and data 
communications 
businesses 
 
Improving productivity 
and efficiency on all 
business areas 
Offer data security for 
transaction services 
 
Orient the fixed 
network toward 
developed data 
services 
 
Create new services 
for mobile phones 
Services businesses will 
be started up in selected 
markets in Europe, Asia 
and the United States 
Enhanced customer 
focus: One Sonera 
 
Maintaining 
innovation 
opportunities 
 
Sonera was spending annually 3–4 per cent of its revenues on research and development, 
emphasizing the role of client satisfaction in its operations. Sonera was concentrating on fast 
growing data solutions and creating new Internet services. When it comes to traditional fixed 
line operations in Finland, Sonera was aiming at providing cost-effective connections and 
customer-oriented service packages. In addition, expanding customer base was seen to have a 
key role and segmentation was the basis of increasing the use of Sonera’s services. Also 
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reseller and call centre networks were strengthened. Being committed to growth in all 
business areas, Sonera was gaining international growth by looking for cooperation 
possibilities. When investing, Sonera offered its expertise to its partners. The last point 
concerning improving productivity and efficiency refers to introducing new information 
systems and recruiting highly educated technology and business professionals. Also, the 
company was preparing for incorporation of telecommunications maintenance and installation 
functions in 1999. (Sonera 1998.) Since 1998, neither financial targets nor strategic objectives 
were written out as straight and precise manner as in 1998.  
 
In 1999, Sonera’s strategy’s overall emphasis had now transferred from Finland to 
international expansion and it specified to mobile communications and new mobile services. 
The company was making significant investments in international telecommunications 
companies in growing market areas. The aim was to increase capacity and speed of its mobile 
communications network. From the future, Sonera was expecting strong demand for 
broadband mobile services around the world. In 1999, Sonera had created two new mobile 
services: WAP technology based wireless Sonera Zed mobile portal and security technique 
service Sonera SmartTrust. Fixed network and market position goals remained unchanged 
from 1998. (Sonera 1999.) 
 
In 2000, Sonera’s way of presenting its strategy changed even though the ultimate thought 
remained unchanged. The vision was to develop into a global telecommunications operator by 
uniting mobile communications and Internet services in an unbiased manner. The strategic 
approach was a two-path model: developing new international service businesses and 
significantly expanding its market area. The paths were parallel and complementary. All in 
all, the strategy was 3G centred and based on Sonera’s core expertise that is, the innovative 
development of services and efficient network operations. In order to reach its strategic 
targets, Sonera was actively studying alternatives for participating in alliances and 
partnerships, which was the general market trend as stated in Chapter 3.1.  
 
In 2000, Sonera took steps towards internationalization of new services, such as Sonera Zed. 
In addition, the company began striving for UMTS licences. Sonera wanted to be profiled 
through services and know-how based on its pioneer position. Significant trust was placed on 
technological solutions enabling new services that differentiate Sonera from its competitors. 
To Sonera, UMTS network indicated new earnings potential and taking part in operating in 
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the network was considered vital. In service and content provider area, Sonera had many 
strengths including operational efficiency and experience in customer segmentation.  
 “It is strategically important for Sonera to take part in defining the specifications for 
new network solutions and to be involved in building the service platforms of the 
future” (Sonera 2000) 
 
Nevertheless, in October 2000 Sonera reviewed its UMTS strategy. In the third quarter 
interim report the company defines that they will concentrate on the already acquired licences, 
on Baltic countries, and with small portions on other European markets. The main market area 
is in Europe. 
 
One year later, in October 2001 Sonera again introduces a new strategy. The investment story 
type changed from growth story into profitability story. In addition, customers were again at 
focus. The strategic development was aiming at accelerating the organization’s short and 
long-term operations. The organization structure changed encompassing finally only three 
main functions. The overall objective of sales and marketing was to increase customer 
satisfaction and revenues. The changed strategy intended to make Sonera’s resources and 
know-how in wider and more efficient use. Also the relationship between customers and 
Sonera was simplified with the basic idea of “easier to do business with Sonera”. (Sonera 
2001.) 
 
UMTS crisis in Finland culminated on TeliaSonera merger in 2002. The official 
announcement was given on March 23, 2002 and the share entered the stock exchange on 
December 10, 2002. The strategy of the new group continued the same line with Sonera’s 
strategy with few exceptions. The emphasis was in home market development that is, in 
Scandinavia and in Baltic countries, and in customer satisfaction. As in 2001, profitability and 
getting over the crisis were in key focus. In addition to strengthening operations in home 
markets, synergies of the merger were emphasized. 
 
To conclude, during 1998–2002 Sonera’s strategic alignments start from traditional operator 
services moving into international third generation mobile network and services and continue 
to concentrating on profitability. Also, the concept of home markets was changed from 
Finland to Scandinavia and Baltic countries. The investment story type changed from growth 
story to profitability story. The changes in Sonera’s strategy followed the market sentiment. 
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First, the company aimed at internationalization and productivity, which both describe the 
phase of hype. After, in 2000, Sonera participated in the 3G licence competitions obtaining 
four licences in Europe. When the market sentiment changed at the end of the year the 
company revised its strategy. Year 2001, on the other hand, did not include major changes in 
strategy until in October, when the new strategy was introduced. Instead of growth, the 
company now focused on profitability by limiting investments in UMTS licences. Year 2002 
brought along TeliaSonera merger and the new group strategy. Even though the market 
demanded for new services throughout the period under review, Sonera did not abandon its 
basic business, fixed line connections that brought them stable income.  
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4 Research data and method  
4.1 Research question 
The objective of this study is to examine how Sonera’s investment story was developed 
through disclosure management during 1999–2002. The findings are compared against the 
interview evidence on what had actually happened in the company and its environment during 
the crisis. The study takes a perspective of investment story that is, how the company strategy 
and financial goals were written out in chosen disclosure outputs.  
 
The research question is divided into two sub-questions: 
1. How does Sonera’s investment story develop during 1999–2002? 
2. How the events that occurred during 1999–2002 explain the changes in the investment 
story development? 
 
The research question is examined through two variables used in the grounded theory based 
model of Gibbins et al. (1990, 1992): ex ante and ex post interpretation management. Despite 
the grounded theory based theoretical framework, the intention of this study is not to provide 
the model with new aspects but rather to illustrate how Sonera’s management has managed 
the investment story during the period under review using ex ante and ex post interpretation 
management. The interview evidence provides understanding on the behaviour of the 
variables – what kind of an influence did the events have on the investment story.  
 
4.2 Research data 
In order to obtain broad data for the research and gain a good overview about the investment 
story building, both written and interview material from the time of the dot-com bubble are 
used. Sonera was formed on July 1,  1998 when the demerger of PT Finland took place.  The 
beginning of the time frame is, however, set to September 1, 1999. On December 10, 2002 
Sonera merged with Swedish Telia that date being the last date of the material collection 
period. The written material is collected from the beginning of the second quarter of 1999 
until the TeliaSonera merger, more precisely the date when the trading of TeliaSonera shares 
commenced: December 9, 2002. 
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The written material consists of Sonera’s interim reports, year-end reports and newspaper 
articles quoting Sonera’s management. Material is detailed in Appendix 3. The reports were 
collected from TeliaSonera’s Finnish website. Year 1998 and the first interim report of 1999 
were excluded due to availability problems. The second and third quarter interim reports from 
1999 and the first quarter of 2001 were collected from an online archive of Finnish economic 
magazine Kauppalehti. All other written research material being in Finnish, these three 
interim reports were available only in English.  
 
Interim reports were chosen because of their specified and clear form. Their content is 
material, they describe the company development, and they are looking at the future. 
(Virtanen 2010, 148.) In addition, their intention is to inform investors about achieving 
financial goals and strategic targets. They are compact packages that are published regularly 
and thus provide a solid base of developing the investment story. The newspaper articles were 
chosen because through the press the company management can seek to influence the general 
feeling and readers’ interpretation. Articles taken into account have been published in Finnish 
magazines Helsingin Sanomat, Kauppalehti, Kauppalehti Optio, Taloussanomat and 
Talouselämä during the period under review. In order to identify the interpretation 
management, only the articles containing straight quotations from Sonera’s management and 
members of the board of directors were accepted as part of the research material. The final 
amount of applicable articles amounts to 20 (see Appendix 3).  
 
The seven interviews were executed during 2009–2010 by researchers of the Department of 
Accounting. They have been made for other research projects concerning Sonera and the 
UMTS period. The seven interviewees were all involved in Sonera during the period under 
review either as board members, operating managers, or analysts. The table of the 
interviewees can be found in Appendix 2. The interview material is used to identify events 
based on which the investment story develops. The interviewees explain how the events 
influenced Sonera and the decision-making.  
 
4.3 Research method and variables 
This study is a qualitative case study that combines different types of research evidence. The 
starting point to this research is the disclosure outputs and the market behaviour. The chosen 
disclosure outputs are placed in the stock price development curve to roughly see what has 
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happened in the market during the time of each disclosure. In this research, the disclosure 
management is examined through two variables ex ante and ex post interpretation 
management as well  as through interview evidence. Interim reports and year-end reports are 
analysed through ex ante factors and newspaper articles through ex post management. 
Interview evidence provides the basis of the event analysis.  
 
Besides strategy, in Gibbins’s et al. (1990, 1992) model also institutional and economic 
environmental factors are part of the disclosure management context. These factors are 
considered as given and hence only described in Chapter 3. The description is based on 
annual reports, interviews, and press articles as well as previous research on the case Sonera. 
Other components of the disclosure subunit status than strategy are not taken into account in 
this research. Financial disclosure management is composed of disclosure issue, disclosure 
position, perceived and defined norms and opportunities, and external mediators. The 
disclosure issue is assumed as periodic due to the nature of quarterly reporting. Disclosure 
position is not taken into account in this research. Thus, especially perceived and defined 
opportunities are under examination in Chapter 5.  
 
The variables used in the study are ex ante and ex post interpretation management. Ex ante 
interpretation management refers to management attempts to influence the interpretation of 
the final disclosure before the disclosure has been released. It is management decisions about 
accounting measurement or classification policies to produce a desired outcome as well as 
anything the management adds to the data, including management analysis, oral remarks, 
burying sensitive information or highlighting good news. Ex ante management takes place 
through both releases and face-to-face interaction. Ex ante interpretation management was 
used during the dot-com bubble as depicted in Chapter 2.1.3. Gibbins et al. (1992) recognize 
the difficulty of distinguishing ex ante management from narrative data. This is considered as 
a challenge when conducting this thesis. 
 
Ex ante interpretation management is examined from interim reports using tone, time focus 
and  causal  statements  as  components  as  in  Gibbins  et  al.  (1990).  Some  shading  in  these  
factors can be seen as indication of ex ante management. Similarly with Gibbins et al. (1990), 
texts are divided into points, one point being one paragraph in the text. Prior to analysing the 
points, chapters concerning Sonera’s share, group structure, board of directors decisions and 
year 2000 program were excluded because they were only telling objective facts with no 
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intention to influence the shareholders. Positive and negative tones expressed in adjectives, 
nouns and verbs indicate use of ex ante management. The tone of each point is defined. Points 
with neutral tone are not taken into account since they indicate that no management has taken 
place. Tone refers to the affect or feeling of the communication and it is a function of both 
content and word choices. Separated from promotionalism4, tone consists of both content and 
words in collected points. A positive tone can be achieved, for example, by focusing on 
positive outcomes, by describing outcomes in a positive way, or by offering positive 
comments about future performance. The tone of each interim and year-end report was 
defined by using a simple equation shown below where the count of negative paragraphs is 
deducted from the count of positive paragraphs and the remainder is divided by the sum of 
both negative and positive paragraphs. The outcome being negative signifies a negative tone 
and vice versa. (Henry 2008.) Previous research has shown that the tone of earnings press 
releases influences investors, which can be noticed from the market reaction (Jameson 2000; 
Henry 2008). The equation is modified based on an equation applied by Henry (2008) who 
used count of words instead of count of paragraphs. The modification is made in order to fit 
the equation with the Gibbins et al. (1990) model when analysing the points. 
 
Tone ratio is calculated as 
 
 
Time focus refers to past, present and future orientation and it tells to what extent the 
disclosure narratives refer to past and future. Present tense refers to those paragraphs in the 
text that describe the situation at the publication date. The text is written in past tense when it 
describes events occurred during and before the period under review and the period between 
the reporting period and the publication date. Future orientation refers to paragraphs that 
describe events after the publication date. If the text in the report refers to events happened 
prior to or after the date of publication the point is shaded by time and hence taken into 
account when examining time focus. Present tense is thus excluded. Applying the 
                                                
4 The promotional purpose of the business text is to influence readers’ view of company performance. 
Promotionalism is expressed with word choices, such as negative versus positive words, way of announcing 
good news and suppressing bad news, choosing benchmarks favorable for the company, and emphasizing 
metrics that allow the company to give a more positive impression of their performance than what it actually is. 
(Henry 2008.) 
-1< Tone < 0 = Negative 
0 < Tone < 1 = Positive   
, 
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-1< Time focus < 0 = Past 
0 < Time focus < 1 = Future   
modification of Henry’s (2008) equation of defining the tone the time focus ratio of different 
reports is calculated. 
 
Time focus ratio is calculated as 
  
 
Due to the subjectivity of defining tone and time focus, an agreement level test was executed. 
Out of the original sample of 1060 points 120 points were randomly chosen to the test. These 
120 points were evaluated by two peer groups, 60 points each. Tone and time focus of the 
points were evaluated. Both peer groups consist of four master students of Aalto University 
School of Economics. In order to test the author’s objectification Fleiss’ kappa is applied. 
(Ikäheimo & Kostiander 2012.) The kappa measure expresses the agreement between the 
author and each peer group member. The average Fleiss’ kappa of overall agreement is 0.51 
(median 0.48) indicating moderate agreement. The average Fleiss’ kappa of time focus only is 
0.49 (median 0.55) and of tone as low as 0.32 (median 0.28). Especially the agreement level 
of tone is significantly low signifying fair agreement. Disagreements between peer group 
members explain the moderate agreement.  
 
Causal statements measure the level of explaining financials, events and goals and they are 
classified to internal to the firm or external to the environment. Thus, how the changes in 
financials and other events occurred can be explained through company’s actions or through 
changes in the environment. (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992.) In addition, causal statements are 
divided into level one and level two statements depending on the level of in-depth analysis of 
the event, for example a causal statement “the growth came particularly from increased use of 
basic text messages” is classified as level one and external to the company. Analysis or 
explanation of why the usage of text messages has increased would raise the statement to 
level two. 
 
In order to provide a deep analysis of the influence of different ex ante interpretation 
management variables on the investment story, the variables are also examined in pairs of 
two. In addition, the development of individual variables is placed on the share price curve. In 
order to better identify the crucial turn points in the share price development, the share price 
is presented as natural logarithm. 
, 
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Ex post management is the attempts to correct or reinforce interpretation of the disclosure on 
hand after the information has been released. Disclosed information is considered as ex post 
management when it has a clear and straight reference to previous disclosure, for example 
correcting press stories or suggesting to analysts that their forecasts are inaccurate. (Gibbins et 
al. 1990, 1992.) In this research, ex post management is examined from newspaper articles. 
Only the articles including straight quotations of Sonera’s management or members of the 
board of directors are taken into account. Indirect presentation is excluded because they 
reflect the subjective voice of the journalist and may not mediate the correct message in 
respect of the goal of this research. 
 
The interviewee evidence is used to identify significant events that took place during the time 
period under review. Eleven events were depicted. The criterion used was that the event was 
to  be  discussed  at  a  large  extent  at  least  in  one  interview.  The  findings  of  the  analysis  of  
separate investment story components are reviewed against the chosen events. The 
interviewees discuss their perspective of what happened during each event and thus provide a 
platform to the evaluation of investment story development. They also discuss about events 
that have not been disclosed bringing out the insider perspective. At this point, also the ex 
post interpretation management aspect is taken into account. Interviews were conducted with 
general interview guide approach by other researchers of the Department of Accounting. The 
interviewer only made sure the interviewee stayed on the general subject of Sonera during the 
UMTS crisis. The interviews provide information, however subjective, about what actually 
happened  in  Sonera  during  the  time  under  review.  The  objective  of  the  analysis  is  to  find  
explanations to why the investment story developed as it did.  
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5 Development of Sonera’s investment story 
This chapter focuses on explaining and analysing the research findings. Chapter 5.1 
introduces the development of individual investment story components in the course of the 
review period. Chapter 5.2 introduces the investment story components in respect of Sonera’s 
share price development. After, the events are retrieved from the interview data and their 
significance and connection to the development of the investment story is analysed. Chapter 
5.4 sums up the research findings. Findings are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Overview of the investment story components  
Out of 1086 points analysed 26 points had no shading in any three categories and they were 
excluded from the sample. The final sample consists of 1060 points out of which 35.3 per 
cent have shading in tone, 98.3 per cent shading in timing and 23.0 per cent have causal 
statements  (whether  level  1  or  2).  Gibbins  et  al.  (1990)  found  that  61  per  cent  of  points  in  
their study had shading in tone or explicit causality. In this thesis the equivalent percentage is 
only 45, which points out the firm-specific nature of the study method also identified by 
Gibbins et al. (1990). 
 
5.1.1 Tone 
Figure 5 describes the tone ratio of interim and year-end reports on a quarterly and yearly 
basis. The tone is classified as positive when it gets a value between 0 and 1, as neutral when 
it is 0 and as negative when it gets a value between -1 and 0. Figure 5 depicts that the tone 
ratio  varies  significantly  throughout  the  period  under  review.  The  value  rises  to  its  most  
positive (0.88) in the second quarter of 1999 and declines to its most negative (-0.13) in the 
year-end report of 2001. Overall, year 1999 is the most positive and year 2001 the most 
negative when measured with tone as can be identified from the year-curve in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 points out that the tone ratio of the first quarter of 2000 is considerably lower than in 
1999. However, the tone begins turning more positive during the year and the third quarter is 
slightly higher than the lowest quarter of 1999 getting a value of 0.63. From the fourth quarter 
of 2000 until the fourth quarter of 2001 the tone declines significantly ending to slightly 
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negative, which signifies difficulties during the year. After, year 2002 is considerably more 
positive than year 2001 with an overall value of 0.5. 
 
Figure 5. Tone of disclosure on a yearly and quarterly basis 
This figure expresses the tone ratio of interim and year-end reports. Tone ratio indicates the positive/negative 
shading in disclosure. Tone ratio is negative when  -1 < n < 0, neutral when n = 0, and positive when 0 < n < 1. 
 
 
 
Tone ratio is calculated separately to the future prospects section of each disclosure in order 
to obtain information about the management’s perception of the future (see Figure 6). The 
tone ratios of future prospects sections are compared to the tone ratio of the subsequent 
quarters in order to examine if the tone of future prospects is transferred to the subsequent 
disclosure. The examination implies that in eight cases out of 13 the future seems more 
positive than what actually took place in the subsequent quarter. The biggest difference 
between the tone of complete disclosure and the future prospects section is in the third quarter 
of 2001. Thus, it can be concluded that either the future seems significantly brighter than the 
past or the company management takes actions to disclose optimistic statements about the 
future in order to influence the share price development, which is recognized as a 
characteristic of the hype. (Virtanen 2010; Mazzola et al. 2009.)  
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As can be identified from Figure 6 below, the tone differs significantly when comparing 
future prospects sections and subsequent disclosures. Before the year-end report of 2001, the 
tone of future prospects is, with two exceptions, more positive than the tone of the next 
period’s disclosure.  
 
Figure 6. Comparison of tone of disclosure and tone of future prospects 
This figure expresses the tone ratio of interim and year-end reports in comparison with the tone ratio of next 
disclosure. Tone ratio is negative when  -1 < n < 0, neutral when n = 0, and positive when 0 < n < 1. 
 
 
 
From the third quarter of 2000 to the third quarter of 2001 the future outlook sections are 
more positive than the next disclosure. This indicates attempts to influence the investor 
behaviour by discussing more optimistically about the future than what it actually appears. 
Indeed, Sonera’s share price was at the lowest during 2001 (see Appendix 1). The third 
quarter of 2001 is interesting due to the significant difference between the third quarter future 
prospects and the year-end report. Disclosures after the year-end of 2001 behave differently in 
comparison to the previous quarters. The tone is more positive in subsequent report than in 
the future prospects chapter. The market conditions had begun to stabilize and no significant 
growth was anticipated. The TeliaSonera merger took place during 2002 as well as the UMTS 
licence write-off. These events are not significantly improving the perception of the 
company’s future. 
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5.1.2 Time focus 
Time focus relates to the extent to which the company discloses information concerning past 
or future events or present conditions. Due to the nature of interim and year-end reports, 
almost every point in the data has some shading in time, mainly past. Out of original 1086 
points  41  were  classified  as  present  and  excluded  from  the  sample  when  examining  time  
focus. Figure 7 below presents the time focus ratio on a yearly and quarterly basis. The time 
focus in each report is past and generally the development is relatively stable. 
 
Figure 7. Time focus of reports compared with ratio describing the whole year 
This figure expresses the time focus ratio of interim and year-end reports on a quarterly and yearly basis. Time 
focus is past when  -1 < n < 0, present when n = 0, and future when 0 < n < 1. 
 
 
The time focus ratio development can be divided into two phases. The first phase consists of 
years 1999 and 2000. During that time the development is following a pattern. First, the time 
focus shifts into more past and in the fourth quarter gets significantly more future oriented 
even though the yearly investigation depicts a shift into more past orientation during 2000 
when compared to 1999. The second phase of the time focus ratio development, 2001 and 
2002, does not follow any trend. The ratio rises and declines from disclosure to another as 
depicted in figure 7. The yearly development of the time focus ratio reflects the easier and 
more difficult years; 1999 and 2002 are more future oriented than 2000 and 2001. During 
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better years the company has courage to disclose more concerning its hopes about the future. 
During challenging years the company concentrates on describing the events already 
occurred. 
 
The far ends of the time focus ratio take place in the first and the second quarters of 2001. The 
most future oriented value is -0.55 in the first quarter and the most past oriented value -0.84 in 
the second quarter. The year-based time focus ratios even up the differences being more 
constant than the quarter based ratios. On a yearly basis, year 1999 is the most future oriented 
with  a  ratio  value  of  -0.68.  Year  2001,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  most  past  oriented  with  a  
yearly value of -0.74.   
 
The time focus is also observed by comparing time focus ratio of the whole disclosure to the 
ratio that does not include the future prospects section. This examination demonstrates that 
the influence of the future prospects section on the time focus of disclosure is significant as 
can be identified in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of time focus including and excluding future prospects sections 
This table indicates how the time focus of complete disclosures is influenced by the future prospects sections. 
Time  focus  is  past  when   -1  <  n  <  0,  present  when  n  =  0,  and  future  when  0  <  n  <  1.  The  effect  of  future  
prospects is measure on a scale from 0 to 1, the smaller the value the smaller the influence. 
 
Disclosure Time(complete disclosure) Time(no prospects) Effect of future prospects 
Q2 1999 -0.68 -0.81 0.13 
Q3 1999 -0.74 -0.86 0.14 
Year-end 1999 -0.63 -0.80 0.17 
Q1 2000 -0.65 -0.86 0.21 
Q2 2000 -0.67 -0.89 0.23 
Q3 2000 -0.75 -0.91 0.16 
Year-end 2000 -0.78 -0.91 0.12 
Q1 2001 -0.55 -0.67 0.13 
Q2 2001 -0.84 -1.00 0.16 
Q3 2001 -0.72 -0.92 0.20 
Year-end 2001 -0.82 -0.98 0.16 
Q1 2002 -0.63 -0.78 0.15 
Q2 2002 -0.76 -0.86 0.10 
Q3 2002 -0.68 -0.90 0.22 
Mean -0.71 -0.87 0.16 
Median -0.70 -0.88 0.16 
 
Evidently, the disclosures are significantly more future oriented due to the future outlook 
section. When examining the positive effect of the future outlook section on the complete 
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disclosure, on a scale from 0 to 1, the smaller the value the smaller the influence. The time 
focus ratios that exclude the future prospects section in Table 3 indicate that the amount of 
future description outside the future prospects section is rather vague. The future outlook 
section has the greatest positive influence on the time focus ratio in the second quarter of 
2000. The influence is the smallest in the fourth quarter of the same year. 
 
In the second quarter of 2001, the future orientation appears only in the outlook section and 
the time focus ration excluding future prospects gets a value of -1, entirely past oriented. This 
aspect explains why the second quarter interim report of 2001 is the most past oriented of the 
disclosures. When compared to lengths of future prospects sections (see Appendix 4) the 
length does not explain the past orientation of this particular disclosure. The future outlook 
section of the second quarter interim report of 2001 is exactly the median and only slightly 
below the average of the whole sample. The most future oriented ratio value of time focus 
without future prospects is in the first quarter of 2001. This signifies that the disclosure has 
the largest amount of future orientation also in other parts of the report than in the future 
outlook section. This same interim report is also the most future related when taken into 
account the complete disclosure. 
 
5.1.3 Causal statements  
Causal statements represent the explanations of events and they are classified in two levels 
based on their profundity and in internal or external to the company. The relative amounts of 
causal statements in different disclosures can be seen in Table 4 below. Due to varying 
lengths of disclosures, causal statements are measured in relative terms and calculated as 
proportion of total amount of points in the disclosure. The mean of the internal and external 
causal statements is somewhat similar to Gibbins et al. (1990). In their study the means are 81 
per cent of internal and 19 per cent of external causal statements. The equivalent means in this 
research are 77 per cent of internal and 32 per cent of external. The difference is assumed to 
be a consequence of both firm specific factors and different environmental circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
52?
?
Table 4. Causal statements in disclosures. 
This table presents the appearance of causal statements in each disclosure as well as the mean and median in 
each category. The relative amount of causal statements is calculated as percentage of report length. The relative 
amount of different levels and internal/external causal statements is calculated as percentage of total amount of 
causal statements in each category. 
 
Disclosure 
Report 
length 
Causal 
statements in 
total 
% of causal 
statements 
Level 1 
Internal 
(%) 
Level 1 
External 
(%) 
Level 2 
Internal 
(%) 
Level 2 
External 
(%) 
Q2 1999 57 14 24.56% 71.43% 28.57%   
Q3 1999 71 17 23.94% 58.82% 35.29%  5.88% 
Year-end 1999 92 34 36.96% 67.65% 32.35%   
Q1 2000 63 16 25.40% 62.50% 31.25% 6.25%  
Q2 2000 86 18 20.93% 77.78% 22.22%   
Q3 2000 96 18 18.75% 83.33% 11.11% 5.56%  
Year-end 2000 102 16 15.69% 87.50% 12.50%   
Q1 2001 56 12 21.43% 83.33% 16.67%   
Q2 2001 52 9 17.31% 66.67% 33.33%   
Q3 2001 59 13 22.03% 61.54% 30.77%  7.69% 
Year-end 2001 90 18 20.00% 61.11% 38.89%   
Q1 2002 78 21 26.92% 71.43% 23.81%  4.76% 
Q2 2002 94 28 29.79% 71.43% 25.00% 3.57%  
Q3 2002 90 21 23.33% 80.95% 19.05%   
Mean 78 18 23.36% 71.82% 25.77% 5.13% 6.11% 
Median 82 18 22.68% 71.43% 26.79% 5.56% 5.88% 
 
The relative amount of causal statements is relatively high during 1999; all values are above 
the mean and the median. In addition, the level of external causal statements exceeds the 
mean and the median in each quarter. In 2000, the amount of causal statements declines 
significantly the year-end relative amount being only 15.7 per cent. After, the amount 
increases but it does not reach the mean and median levels until in 2002. Years 2000 and 
2001 remain below the mean and median amounts of causal statements. All in all, when 
examining the yearly amounts of causal statements, difficult years 2000–2001 have less 
causal statements in relation to the length of disclosure than the good years 1999 and 2002. 
When examining the appearance of causal statements, Sonera is thus depicted to tend to 
provide more explanations in good times than in more difficult years. 
 
Gibbins et al. (1992, 17) refer to a research of Daveni and McMillan (1990, in Gibbins et al. 
1992) concluding that the annual report’s letter to shareholders tends to have more 
information about the external environment when the company has survived from a financial 
crisis. If the company has not survived from the crisis, the letter tends to have more 
information about internal issues. Based on this statement it is suggested that when the 
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company is doing well the level of external causal statements increases and when the 
company has difficulties the level of internal causal statements increases. Hence, the changes 
in appearance of internal and external causal statements imply the company’s situation and 
position perceived by the management. 
 
In the sample, a notable amount of level one internal causal statements is explaining the 
causality between two financial ratios. Generally speaking, during the period under review 
Sonera was not searching for explanations from its business environment but inside the 
company. When reflecting against findings of Gibbins et al. (1992), this behaviour signifies a 
challenging situation. The distribution of the first and second level statements signifies that 
the company did not analyse the reasons for events but rather settled for short explanations. 
The research evidence includes only six second level causal statements and they concern the 
NMT network change into GSM network, changes in customer behaviour, the law and 
accounting policy changes concerning Sonera and its associated company Turkcell, as well as 
changes in Sonera’s joint ventures’ UMTS strategies and actions. The changes in internal and 
external causal statements follow a patter in one-year series. When compared to prior 
disclosure as of the fourth quarter of 1999, the trend of external causal statements is declining. 
In the fourth quarter of 2000, it turns into increase until it begins declining again in the 
beginning of 2002. This implies that Sonera was doing better from the fourth quarter of 2000 
until the fourth quarter of 2001. The highest percentage of external statements is, however, in 
periods between the second quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of 2000, and the second 
quarter of 2001 and the fourth quarter of 2001. The company perceives the situation being the 
best possible in respect of prevailing circumstances. Events during the two time periods are 
positive from the company’s point of view with regard to future expectations. The highest 
percentages during the first of the two time periods can be explained with the extreme hype 
and expectations related to NASDAQ listing. The second time period is shaded with finally 
stabilising share price development and implementation of the new company strategy.  
 
5.1.4 Combined ex ante management components 
All in all, the ex ante management based investment story develops as identified in figure 8 
that presents the combination of tone ratio and time focus ratio, causal statements and time 
focus ratio, and tone ratio and causal statements. When examining the disclosures in figure 
8.1, the tone varies significantly while the time focus remains rather stable over the period 
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under review. Thus, out of these two components, the principal component influencing 
Sonera’s investment story is  tone.  In that respect,  years 2000 and 2002 seem to be the most 
similar compared to 1999 and 2001 that represent the far ends. Year 1999 is the most future 
oriented and at the same time the most positive. This clearly indicates hype that took place in 
1999 and 2000. Year 2001 is the least positive and the most past oriented reflecting a difficult 
year for the company.  
 
Figure 8. Development of different combinations of investment story components 
Figure series 8.1–8.3 express the development of investment story components in disclosures on a yearly basis 
from 1999 to 2002. In figure 8.2, tone ratio of causal statements is calculated as the tone of disclosure but taking 
into account only the tone of causal statements. In figure 8.3, time focus of causal statements is calculated as the 
time focus of disclosure but taking into account only the time orientation of causal statements. The percentage of 
causal statements is calculated as number of causal statements divided by number of points in disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Tone ratio and time focus 
Figure 8.3. Causal statements and tone Figure 8.2. Causal statements and time focus 
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Figure 8.2 depicts that time focus of causal statements behaves differently when compared to 
the time focus of disclosures. Time focus in 2000 is the most future oriented and the relative 
amount of causal statements is the lowest. In addition, year 2001 is the most past oriented in 
causal statements. All in all, the time orientation of causal statements varies significantly 
more than in complete reports. In figure 8.3 the tone ratio of causal statements is depicted to 
develop accordingly with the tone ratio of complete reports. However, the drop in positivity 
from 1999 to 2000 is significantly deeper in causal statements than in the complete report. 
Year 2001 gets a negative value when causal statements are measured, the negativity of the 
trend of 2001 until the year-end report is evident. The development of causal statements’ tone 
indicates that the tone plays a bigger role in causal statements than in the complete reports. 
Causal statements explain the positive or negative events and thus get more frequently 
shading in tone. This expounds on the negative tone ratio of 2001 and also the larger drop 
from 1999 to 2000 in causal statements’ tone ratio. 
 
When taking into account the time focus of different levels of causal statements on a yearly 
basis what can be concluded is that definitely the most causal statements are internal and past 
oriented. On the other hand, the biggest difference in appearance is in external past oriented 
statements. An interesting observation is made: year 1999 is characterized with hype and 
when examining the time focus of the disclosures it is the most future oriented. In this respect, 
time focus of causal statements and time focus of the disclosure are contradictory. When 
examining causal statements year 1999 is less future oriented than 2000. The contradiction 
can be explained with the nature of causal statements. In 1999, Sonera focuses on explaining 
the positive events taken place during the quarter at hand whereas in 2000 the emphasis is on 
forthcoming new services and 3G. Similarly with tone-time combination, year 2001 is the 
most past oriented also when measured against causal statements. 
 
In 1999 and 2001, the level of past oriented statements is significantly higher than during 
2000 and 2002. Years 1999 and 2002 have exactly the same relative amount of past and 
future oriented causal statements, 86 per cent of past oriented and 14 per cent of future 
oriented statements. Year 2000 is the most future oriented and year 2001 the less future 
oriented in respect of causal statements. Year 2001 is shaded with the UMTS failure in 
Europe, which explains the negativity. The appearance of different time focuses in causal 
statements suggests that when something extraordinary has happened in the market during the 
past quarter it is explained more than the perceived future events.  
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5.1.5 Ex post management in news articles 
The  amount  of  ex  post  interpretation  management  in  news  articles  is  rather  small.  Only  20  
articles include ex post management, that is, straight management quotations that refer to 
already published information. List of articles applied in this research can be found in 
Appendix 3. Many articles, which are not taken into consideration in this study, published 
during the period under review could be considered having interpretation management but 
since they do not contain ex post interpretation management they were left out from the final 
list of articles. The small quantity of such articles in Finnish main newspaper and financial 
newspapers was surprising. There was no ex post management found in articles concerning 
the financial year 1999. From year 2000 eight articles were selected, from 2001 nine articles, 
and from 2002 two articles. Figure 9 describes the distribution of the articles containing ex 
post factors in relation to the share price development.  
 
Figure 9. Appearance of articles with ex post interpretation management 
This figure expresses the distribution of articles containing ex post interpretation management quotations in 
relation to the share price development. Share price development is presented as natural logarithm of the share 
price. The bars indicate the publication dates of ex post newspaper articles.  
 
In figure 9, the bars indicate the publication dates of newspaper articles that include 
quotations with ex post interpretation management. What can be concluded from the graph is 
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that the articles accumulate to the time period of the share price dive as well as to the dates of 
the interim and year-end reports. During the third and fourth quarters of 2000, the articles, 
however, are situated also in between the disclosure dates. This observation about the 
appearance of ex post management suggests that the more articles containing ex post 
management the more difficult the company’s situation in the market. This suggestion is, 
however, not in line with findings about appearance of internal and external causal 
statements. Appearance of articles containing ex post management indicates that Sonera’s 
difficult time situates between the second quarter of 2000 and third quarter of 2001. Causal 
statements, on the other hand, suggest that Sonera’s difficult time situates to the first three 
quarters of 2000 and to year 2002. Causal statements are considered more credible measures 
of good and bad time due to interim report’s longer time frame. News articles observe only 
one event. 
 
5.2 Event analysis 
This  chapter  seeks  to  further  analyse  the  ex  ante  and  ex  post  interpretation  management  in  
chosen disclosures. The overall development of the investment story is introduced by placing 
the interpretation management components on the share price development curve and the 
influence and importance of different events on investment story during the review period are 
analysed. The selected, most important, events under observation are presented on the share 
price curve in Appendix 1.  
 
5.2.1 Identifying the important events  
In this chapter, the important events are recognized from the interview evidence. In order to 
identify the investment story development from one event to another, different components of 
investment story are placed on the share price development curve. The seven interviewees 
emphasize 11 events from the time period under review and they are listed in Table 5 that also 
illustrates the development of different investment story components during each event. The 
events are discussed chronologically in Chapters 5.2.2–5.2.12 and they are placed on the 
share price curve in Appendix 1. Some events take place on one day only whereas other 
events refer to special themes during a longer period of time. Due to the difference in the time 
periods of appearance some events overlap. 
 
58?
?
Table 5. The development of investment story components in relation to the events 
This table presents the events chosen from the interview evidence. Quarters are compared to the previous quarter. In tone ratios, “+” signifies more positive and “-“ more negative. In time focus 
“+” signifies more future oriented and “-“ more past oriented. In causal statements, “+” signifies increase and “-“ decline. 0 signifies no change from the previous year. 
Event Date / time frame Disclosure Tone Tone of prospects Time focus 
Causal statements 
Internal 
Causal statements 
External 
Internet hype September –December 1999 
Q2 1999 
Q3 1999 
FS 1999 
 
- 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
 
- 
+ 
 
+ 
- 
NASDAQ listing 13.10.1999 FS 1999 + + + + - 
UMTS hype and auctions January– August 2000 
Q1 2000 
Q2 2000 
Q3 2000 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
Share price crash 6.3.2000 Q1 2000 - + - + - 
Obtaining the UMTS licence in Germany 17.8.2000 Q3 2000 + + - + - 
Announcement of redefined strategy 23.10.2000 FS 2000 - + - + - 
Failed merger with Telia January 2001 Q1 2001 - 0 + - + 
Bottom of the share price 21.9.2001 Q3 2001 - + + + - 
Announcement of new strategy 23.10.2001 FS 2001 - - - 0 0 
TeliaSonera merger 26.3.2001 Q1 2002 + 0 + + - 
UMTS write-offs 25.7.2002 Q3 2002 + + + + - 
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Figures 10–12 illustrate how the ex ante interpretation management components develop 
during the period under review in relation to the share price. The share price development is 
presented as natural logarithm, which better demonstrates the changes in the share price. Also 
the publication dates of the interim reports and the year-end reports are identified on the 
curve. Interim and year-end reports are special in nature when it comes to data organization 
and information set. Reports are built on top of each other on a yearly basis and thus contain 
large amount of same information compared to the foregoing quarters of the same year. In 
other words, the data content itself changes but the text around the numbers changes only to a 
lesser degree. Also, the explaining chapters are often constant from one quarter to another 
until the first interim report of the subsequent year. 
 
Figure 10. Tone ratio and share price development 
This figure expresses the tone ratio development of whole disclosure and of future prospects section in different 
disclosure. Share price development is expressed as natural logarithm of the share price. Tone ratio is negative 
when  -1 < n < 0, neutral when n = 0, and positive when 0 < n < 1. 
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Figure 11. Time focus ratio and share price development 
This figure expresses the time focus ratio on the share price curve. The development of the share price is presented as 
natural logarithm. Time focus is past when  -1 < n < 0, present when n = 0, and future when 0 < n < 1. 
 
 
Figure 12. Causal statements placed on the share price development curve 
This figure expresses the share price development as natural logarithm of the share price and compares it to the 
development of different levels and internal/external aspect of causal statements. Different causal statement types are 
expressed as percentage of the total amount of causal statements in each disclosure. 
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The hype of 1999 was led by the Internet and the new technology. In Figures 10–12, the hype 
is depicted in fast increasing share price. The trading of Sonera’s shares in NASDAQ began 
on October 13, 1999. The listing accelerated the Sonera hype during the fourth quarter of the 
year. Thus, the first and second events in Table 5 are closely connected. During the third and 
fourth quarters of 1999, the tone ratio first drops significantly from the second quarter and 
then increases slightly as can be identified in Figure 10. Both tone types, the complete 
disclosure and the future outlook section, develop similarly in 1999. However, the tone of 
future prospects changes more strongly. Time focus shifts towards the future end and the level 
of external causal statements is significantly higher than the mean and the median signifying 
good time for the company. The level of internal statements is the lowest of the review period 
indicating good performance. When examining year 1999 on a quarterly basis the hype is not 
clearly identifiable. However, the yearly numbers express the hype: extremely high tone and 
future orientation, the highest relative amount of causal statements, and high level of external 
causal statements (see Figures 5–6 and Table 4). 
 
Year 2000 was raised above other years in the interviews when the interviewees discussed 
four important events taken place during the year: UMTS hype and the auctions, the share 
price crash, the UMTS licence acquisition in Germany, and the announcement of the 
redefined strategy. Where the hype of 1999 was led by new technology, the hype of 2000 is 
characterized by UMTS emphasis. Preparation for the UMTS auctions and beauty contests 
began during the spring of 2000 and were completed by September. During the first quarter of 
2000, the tone ratio behaves interestingly. Tone of future prospects keeps increasing into 
more positive but the tone of complete disclosure dives towards negative. During the same 
quarter Sonera’s share price collapsed, which is assumed to influence the negative 
development of the overall tone ratio. Tone ratio of future prospects declines significantly into 
more negative during the second quarter and increases again into more positive in the third. 
The tone of disclosure increases in both quarters. During the first and the second quarters of 
the year both tone ratios develop conversely and in the third quarter they end up close to each 
other.  When reviewing  the  time focus  ratio  from 1999 to  2002 it  seems to  follow the  share  
price development. During the first three quarters of 2000 when the UMTS hype reigned over 
the market, the time focus ratio declines towards the past orientation. The drop during the 
third quarter is considerable. With the declining share price also the level of external causal 
statements declines and the level of internal statements increases. 
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Sonera introduced the redefined strategy on October 23, 2000. In the year-end report of 2000 
the tone shades into more negative but the tone of future prospects reaches its maximum value 
of +1, extremely positive. At the same time, the time focus ratio continues declining towards 
negative and first level internal causal statements reach their highest value of the review 
period. An event that  is  not identified from interim or annual reports but is  discussed in the 
interviews is the failed merger between Sonera and Swedish Telia in January 2001. 
Congruent with Cole (2001), Virtanen (2010), and Stienstra et al. (2004), there was no 
evidence found that this merger plan would have been announced to the public. The tone ratio 
of the first quarter interim report of 2001 declines from the previous quarter and the tone of 
future prospects stays in the maximum value of +1. Time focus ratio jumps upwards and 
reaches its greatest value during the review period. The level of external causal statements 
begins increasing identifying improving situation. 
 
Sonera’s share price reached its bottom on September 21, 2001. In the third quarter of the 
year the tone ratio is less positive but does not yet reach its smallest value of the review 
period as could be assumed. Surprisingly, the tone ratio of future prospects rises back to +1. 
In addition, the time focus gets more future oriented and the level of external causal 
statements increases. The company published its new strategy on October 23, 2001. When 
compared to previous events the investment story components behave differently. The tone 
ratio of full disclosure and tone ratio of future prospects change significantly turning into 
more negative. Tone of disclosure even gets a negative value. Also, the time focus ratio 
shades into more past. Similar trend in development continues during 2002. On March 26, 
2002 Sonera announced its merger with Swedish Telia. The interim report of the first quarter 
of the year is rather positive what comes to the tone and time ratios. Tone of disclosure 
increases significantly into more positive, and the tone of prospects stays at the level of the 
previous quarter. Time focus ratio increases approaching future orientation. In addition, 
reversely with tone, the level of internal causal statements increases. At the end of July, 
Sonera wrote off the German and the Italian licences worth 4.6 billion euros. This move was 
welcomed with positive market reaction and similarly with the first quarter of the year, both 
tone ratios and time ratio increase. Again, the level of internal causal statements increases. 
 
To conclude, the events discussed cover all besides the second quarters of 2001 and 2002. 
What is significant is that both tone ratios and time focus ratio develop similarly only in 1999 
and 2002 (see Table 5). Both of these years are positive from Sonera’s perspective. Tone and 
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external causal statements both increase only in first quarter of 2000, fourth quarter of 2000, 
and third quarter of 2001. Tone of prospects and external causal statements behave similarly 
only during one quarter, the second quarter of 2000. In 1999, the hype increases Sonera’s 
market value and possibilities in the business environment. In 2002, the share price 
development settled down and the write-off in July gave the market value a positive boost. 
When Sonera’s share price dived as of March 2000, the company was aiming at settling down 
the drop with extremely positive future outlook sections as identified in Figure 10. The tone 
of  outlook  sections  shade  into  more  positive  from the  end  of  1999 until  the  third  quarter  of  
2001 with one exception. The development of causal statements in respect of internal/external 
focus indicates, when observed against the share price curve, that when the company faces 
difficulties the higher degree of explanations to changes are sought from the company’s 
actions than from the business environment. On the other hand, when the difficulties 
continue, the company adapts to the situation and the level of external causal statements 
begins increasing indicating more positive perception about the company’s prevailing 
situation. This is in line with the suggestion of Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992) that increase in 
external causal statements implies that the company has survived from the crisis.  
 
5.2.2 Hype of the new technology in 1999 
The new technology was hyped in 1999 when Sonera’s share price growth reached its full 
speed. Sonera was adapting to new technological solutions. Manager F calls Sonera’s story 
during 1998–1999 a mobile story, a story of an advanced small mobile society that had exotic 
and interesting 2G investments in Turkey, in Baltic countries, in Russia and in the USA. The 
reputation of a “mobile wonderland” set expectations. (Interviewee F, manager.) Due to this 
reputation of an advantageous market many investors were suggesting that Sonera should 
abandon the base business of telephone operator and fixed connections. Sonera, however, 
explained the necessity of the old telecom business with profitability and its task as a national 
operator. In later years, it was realized that the promotion of new technology came too soon. 
(Interviewee E, board member.) Due to the forerunner position, Sonera needed to carefully 
consider the stability of the basis of its business: whether it was possible to create service 
concept innovations and intellectual property that could be commercialized later. (Interviewee 
A, manager.) Manager D argues that during the hype the investors were mainly interested in 
future prospects. Also Sonera was targeting new innovations, products and services. 
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The strong base business provided a platform for “a possible birth of Internet related 
innovations”. (Interviewee A, manager.) Spurred by demand for new innovations and 
favourable increase in the share price, Sonera was developing a broad range of unique mobile 
services. Sonera Zed and Sonera SmartTrust were launched during 1998–1999. This increased 
the company’s confidence on chosen strategy. (Interviewee D, manager.) Finally, Sonera’s 
value was based on these two elements: the base business and the new services. (Interviewee 
A, manager.) 
“And at the end of the 90s Sonera was actively purchasing patents and ideas for 
building this service package.” (Interviewee D, manager) 
 
Hype was not concerning only Sonera but the whole telecommunications sector. Sonera’s 
share price development followed the development of the new technology enterprises in 
general. Manager F argues that only an extremely strong strategy and possibilities to reach the 
goals might have a slight influence on the valuation of the company in the financial market. 
He emphasizes that what the companies write about the future, especially if it is not in line 
with the prevailing trend, is insignificant. (Interviewee F, manager.) In order to meet the 
markets’ requirements, Sonera created a specific image to itself and to its services based on 
the new technology. The spirit of the era was “marketing, marketing, and marketing” and the 
company  was  expected  to  give  more  and  more  promises  every  day.  The  vast  amount  of  
information about the new technology got the market confused. (Interviewee E, board 
member.) Interviewee E states the essence of ex ante interpretation management during the 
hype when saying:  
“… the user market didn’t understand what is coming. You have to educate them, you 
have to build the market when this technology development has been so speedy one.” 
(Interviewee E, board member) 
 
The enormous increase in Sonera’s market value was realized being only temporary and 
instead of building business on hype the company was aiming at building permanent 
competences. (Interviewee A, manager.) The investment story components behave differently 
in 1999 when compared to the following years 2000 and 2001. The tone ratio and the time 
focus ratio both decline indicating that the company had recognized the extremely positive 
market expectations and by disclosing significantly more negative and past oriented interim 
reports Sonera was seeking more optimistic image in the market. However, the increase in 
external causal statements reveals the management’s positive view of the business 
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environment and its development. Indeed, during the third quarter of 1999 the relative amount 
of external causal statements is the highest in the review period amounting to 41 per cent. 
Interviewee A describes how the company was taking measures to slow down the share price 
development due to their own beliefs about the future.  
“But at that point [when the price was increasing] many of course guessed or knew that 
the bubble is being built…” (Interviewee G, analyst) 
 
“Inside Sonera they had their goals high but not as high as the market thought. That’s 
how I perceived it. Sonera was thinking of changing into a service house.” (Interviewee 
F, manager)  
 
In an overheated market situation the company faces a question of how much “cold water” is 
needed to cool the situation down. This aspect can be seen in the ex ante interpretation 
management during 1999. The tone and time focus ratios decline towards negative and past 
during the third quarter and the level of external causal statements increases (see Table 5). 
The investment story components in the year-end report of 1999 develop conversely with the 
third quarter report. The tone ratio of both the disclosure and the future prospects section 
rebounds but does not reach the high level of the second quarter. This implies that the 
company adheres to the cooling down measures. The increment in level of internal causal 
statements reflects that the company had realized that the hype couldn’t go on for long, as 
analyst G and manager A state.  
 
Interviewee G, the analyst, criticises the companies’ hype culture. He states that during the 
IT-bubble companies even tended to disclose false stock exchange releases in order to meet 
the short-term targets. Also earnings management was recognized as common because 
companies preferred positive surprises to negative. Finally, when a company disclosed new 
information the analysts had reservations concerning the credibility of information. 
(Interviewee G, analyst.) A dilemma arises. The analyst blames investors, mediators, 
companies, and the media for being too optimistic and the managers of Sonera emphasize the 
analysts’ role in building the bubble. Interviewee A, a manager, states that in press releases 
Sonera advised investors to use their judgement and that Sonera’s top management had some 
disagreements concerning the level of optimism in the disclosure. When examining the 
investment story components, in Sonera’s case the cooling down measures are recognized 
during the period under review, not the overly optimistic statements suggested by the analyst 
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G. The hype was realized inside Sonera, its board of directors and top management were 
anticipating a catastrophe to arrive. (Interviewee E, board member.)  
“The formation of the bubble was believed in already and when the company was 
giving comments they weren’t trusted because the common hype was seen in them.” 
(Interviewee G, analyst)  
 
5.2.3 NASDAQ listing  
In the late 1990s Sonera was seeking growth in the USA and American investors only 
invested in shares listed in their domestic market. Sonera followed the trend and went to the 
USA and to NASDAQ in October 1999. Trading began on October 13, 1999. (Interviewee A, 
manager.) After the listing hype spurted, which can be identified in Figures 10–12. The 
NASDAQ listing made Sonera revise its strategy according to the changed business 
environment. (Interviewee D, manager) As a forerunner, Sonera’s introduction to NASDAQ 
was expected. The NASDAQ index had a technology emphasis the regulatory requirements of 
which were easily met. However, all interviewees are not totally for going to the US. Manager 
A thinks that Sonera’s governance was not yet ready for such a move at such speed.  
 
The  original  plan  behind  the  stock  exchange  listing  was  to  collect  means  of  payment  for  
internationalization, expansion and acquisitions. In addition, the company was aiming at 
achieving means of bonus systems and personnel policy. However, the financing plans were 
turned down by the Finnish government. (Interviewee B, manager; Interviewee D, manager; 
Interviewee F, manager.)  
“It was turned down [using shares in M&A] time after time and that finally drove 
Sonera to a situation where the only way to continue the internationalization strategy 
created at the end of the 90s was to purchase licences or scopes of action abroad with 
pure money.”(Interviewee D, manager) 
 
The year-end report of 1999 is more positive and more future oriented compared to the third 
quarter. Tone ratios increase but do not reach the high levels of the second quarter. The more 
future oriented time focus reflects the positive future expectations brought by the listing. Tone 
and causal statements tell a contradictory story. The level of internal causal statements 
increases, which implies that the company is not fully confident to its situation in the 
environment – some uncertainties exist. Originally the company strategy consisted of 
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investing in minority shareholdings. Sonera was reaching for foothold in broad areas where 
their expertise was valued and where the other big players were not operating. Turkey, the 
Baltic countries and the whole of Eastern Europe were perceived as those, one of the most 
profitable investments being Turkcell in Turkey. Some exotic countries were, however, left 
out. (Interviewees A, manager; Interviewee D, manager.)  
“We were also offered deals from Africa. If we had concluded the deal in South Africa, 
I don’t know, it would have been the outstandingly best deal ever. But it was perceived 
as too politically risky.” (Interviewee A, manager) 
 
The interview evidence has some discrepancies. While some interviewees are for the strategy 
of minority shareholdings others are strongly against it. Manager A finds one big problem in 
the internationalization strategy: minority shareholdings did not bring money to the company. 
After a CEO change in January 1999 also the strategy was revised as manager D states below. 
Here the already mentioned contradiction between the company and the Finnish government 
realizes. 
“We had this group of people from the finance world, led by Relander, who thought like 
bankers tend to think, that wherever you go you need to have control over the company, 
they were aiming at majority shareholdings, but they were also well noticing that we 
had no resources before obtaining shares that could be used as money.” (Interviewee 
D, manager) 
 
5.2.4 UMTS hype in 2000 and licence auctions  
UMTS hype and licence auctions took place during the three first quarters of 2000. Creating 
new services was central in the UMTS hype, which was built especially around mobile 
services. The feeling in the telecom market was excessively positive. (Interviewee B, 
manager) Sonera was aggressively implementing and utilizing new technology, among others 
Sonera Zed and Sonera SmartTrust that had been endogenously created already during 1998–
1999. Until the value collapse in September–October 2000, the valuations of Sonera 
SmartTrust and Sonera Zed were tens of billions even though the companies had no revenues 
but the valuations were not questioned. (Interviewee B, manager.)  
 
The hype based method of operating aroused contradictions among the company. In other 
words, Sonera was operating in two layers: the managers in contact with the public and the 
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people running the ordinary business. The development of new services was not in line with 
market demand. (Interviewee E, board member.) Interviewee A argues that if the market had 
been opposing, the company would have invested less. The 3G data promise was credible and 
several market players had similar goals boosting the new technology. (Interviewee A, 
manager.) 
“Thinking about the relationship with this sector and the investor’s society, that 
everything was built on expectations and nobody knew exactly how it would develop.” 
(Interviewee B, manager) 
 
Also analysts had their share in feeding the hype. They published too optimistic analyses 
about Sonera aiming at explaining the constantly increasing price to the market. So at least to 
some extent the analysts and banks are being blamed for Sonera’s hype. (Interviewee F, 
manager.) In addition to the third generation, also the fourth generation was discussed. 
(Interviewee E, board member.) 
 “…they [the analysts] had come to some theoretical profit which was then published and 
through that a certain market value was fixed. I remember that the company 
communicated strongly with the investment banks at this stage, that why an earth were 
they publishing this information. That it has no real basis.” (Interviewee F, manager) 
 
In spite of the alignment from 1999 of not participating in the UMTS fuss, when the earnings 
potential grew the decision of joining the 3G network business became evident. The market 
was expecting new services to be launched despite the fact that the trust in the sector was 
beginning to fracture. Without investing in the licences Sonera would have lost the expertise 
it had gained over the past years. In presentations, the 3G network and services were 
introduced as fast to mobilize (Interview F, manager; Interviewee B, manager.) Manager F 
calls Sonera’s strategy at the time a crab claw strategy. The company provided investors with 
presentations about fast transfer to 3G networks and services. The company wanted to be 
present where the money is. (Interviewee F, manager.) 
 
Sonera’s bright outlook is not reflected in time focus, which declines towards the past during 
the three first quarters of 2000. The constant decline in time focus ratio implies that Sonera 
was  concentrating  on  disclosing  past  events.  Future  did  not  have  a  significant  role  in  the  
disclosures. The time focus ratio rather reflects the management’s concerns about the 
excessive attraction towards Sonera’s new services. The company was continuously aiming at 
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stabling the expectations and began to realize what was about to happen in the share market. 
Manager A highlights the situation being challenging. The state-ownership made the 
circumstances even more difficult due to the political aspect. (Interviewee A, manager.) 
“Sometimes one tends to think that it’s nice when the share price is high but if it’s too 
high then it’s a big problem for everyone. Because someone needs to discharge the 
expectations and the disappointments. They will erupt through some mechanism and 
usually they are nasty mechanisms.” (Interviewee A, manager) 
 
Despite the concerns about the excessive attention, Sonera believed in the earnings potential 
of 3G. Manager A says that there was indication that the average usage in euros per 
subscriber had no ceiling. (Interviewee A, manager.) What was not taken into account at this 
point was the concentrated risk arising from focusing on only one market area. (Interviewee 
D, manager.)   
“The average revenue per user, the estimates for five years forward were somewhere in 
80 euros per customer and there’s still today 25 euros or so, what they were at that time 
as well maybe even higher.”(Interviewee B, manager) 
 
The trust in new technology, high future expectations, and the earnings potential of 3G 
services influence the tone ratio that first shades into more negative in the first quarter and 
then increases into more positive during the second and third quarters of 2000. The decline 
results from the share price crash in the beginning of March as will be discussed in Chapter 
5.2.5. The declining tone ratio of the first quarter refers also to cooling down measures taken 
in order to stabilize the hype. The tone of future prospects, however, increases in the first 
quarter, next it turns slightly more negative, and in the third quarter increases again. The 
increasing tone ratio implies that Sonera’s management mediated to the market messages of 
trust in the UMTS. Again, the contradiction between tone and causal statements appears. The 
growth trend in internal causal statements is assumed to signify company’s lack of trust in the 
market position and suggest that uncertainties about the future exist. 
 
At the same time with Sonera’s increasing confidence in 3G, the market confidence was 
starting to fracture. Finally, investor criticism towards the licence competitions and the 
UMTS networks increased and the debate became negative due to lack of end market. 
(Interviewee E, board member; Interviewee F, manager.) The negativity of the market is 
reflected  in  more  positive  tone  ratio  with  which  the  company aims  at  positively  influencing  
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the market sentiment. However, in order to keep some optimism, Sonera did not quantify5 its 
value before the execution of the 3G investments. Manager F explains this with pressure from 
the investors’ and banks’ side. The company was prepared to publish information about the 
quantified values not prior to one year after introduction to the stock exchange that is, at the 
end of 2000. The company even advanced the release of quantified values due to high 
demand. 
“But what was found there pleased no one. All in all, during fall 2000 the market 
situation had not yet gotten cold, asset value decline was about to begin at the telecom-
side. We were seeking stability and we wanted, since our unawareness aroused 
perturbation, we needed to nail something in order to stabilize the situation.” 
(Interviewee F, manager) 
 
During the second quarter, Sonera signed up for the UMTS licence auction in Germany. This 
put pressure on the company, since at the same time it withdrew from an auction in Great 
Britain. (Interviewee A, manager.) The positive tone in the interim reports was needed in 
order to explain to investors why winning the auction was favourable for the company. The 
German market was chosen because, among others, they did not require immediate network 
building but instead it was to be built in stages during a longer period of time. In addition, for 
the Finnish companies Germany was a target country, a big and attractive market. 
(Interviewee B, manager.) The licence in Germany was obtained in August 2000. 
“…right after there was quite a buyer’s remorse going on.” (Interviewee A, manager) 
 
In late August, Sonera announced its participation in Italian licence acquisition. The 
announcement was recognized in the media. Sonera perceived this market in a different, more 
realistic, way than the German market, which is also apparent in the ex post statements. The 
company acknowledges the time-demanding network building and the importance of long-
term planning.  
“The market is at the moment fairly developed.” (Kauppalehti 24.8.2000) 
 
“Investments are made for several years in advance but the share price development 
happens daily. A lot has happened before we will be building the UMTS. (Kauppalehti 
24.8.2000) 
                                               
5 Sonera did not calculate a numerical value to itself or to its services. 
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5.2.5 Share price crash  
 “Sometimes your ambitions are too high.” (Interviewee E, board member) 
 
Sonera’s share price crashed on March 6, 2000. Before the collapse, telecommunications 
companies were taking corrective measures to cool down the fast climbing share price and 
after the collapse to stop the dive. Companies were under the impression that the measures 
taken had been enough to settle down the dip. Only when the share price reached its bottom 
and began to find the balance the companies realized the reality of the situation. (Interviewee 
G, analyst.) 
“At that time it wasn’t yet realized how everything would be left like after a bomb…” 
(Interviewee G, analyst) 
 
Tone and time focus ratios support Sonera’s negative market development. Despite the 
boosting investment story measures, a company needs to consider also the prevailing market 
situation. The tone of the first quarter interim report is the most negative in 2000. Tone ratio 
of future prospects increases describing the UMTS hype and strong trust in the future. The 
time focus becomes more past oriented even though the decline is only minor. Nevertheless, 
time focus is the most future oriented of the year. The analyst G names two reasons for the 
share price collapse: volatility and changing market sentiment. The promises, that are too 
good to be true, decrease the market value of the company and raise confidence issues. After 
the company has lost the market confidence communicating to the market becomes more 
difficult.  
 
Sonera’s share price decline is significant as can be identified in the Figures 10–12 and 
Appendix 1. The interview evidence, however, proves that the industry-wide UMTS hype did 
not slow down until after the summer 2000. The investors and the industry were thus living in 
different worlds. The investment story components do not support the hype during the first 
quarter of 2000 but rather the negative market development. Only the tone ratio of future 
prospects is more positive compared to the year-end report of 1999. Tone and time focus 
ratios decline and the level of internal causal statements increases slightly. According to 
Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992) this implies that the company perceives that it has not yet survived 
from the crisis. The situation at the disclosure date had already changed into more positive 
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even though the company did not support the hype anymore at this point. (Interviewee A, 
manager.) 
 
Interviewee G, the analyst, remembers thinking that the company had seriously drifted apart 
from its base factors. The extreme increase in share prices happened only during few months, 
which does not happen in normal market situation. As a result, Sonera had abandoned its 
emphasis on fixed line and 2G mobile networks and began concentrating on new technology 
services such as Sonera Zed and SmartTrust. Manager A argues that it is companies’ 
responsibility to look in the future and model the coming moves. This was conducted during 
the period of hype but the UMTS project was executed in the overheated market situation in 
which it was not yet ready to be evaluated with financial measures. The measurement criteria 
were also overheated.  Wrong timing ended in the share price crash and declining investor 
confidence. 
“So does it matter how the company is communicating in a situation like this?” 
(Interviewee G, analyst)  
 
5.2.6 Obtaining the licence in Germany 
The UMTS auction in Germany took place in August 2000. Sonera had high expectations 
towards the auction and strong confidence in the joint venture and the German market. One 
background force for bidding as high amount as 8.5 billion euros for the licence was the 
experience from previous auctions. Sonera had seen other operators profit considerable 
amounts of money and believed that the trend was long lasting. (Interviewee D, manager.)  
 
Sonera’s UMTS story in Germany commenced as positive. The joint venture of Orange, 
Telefónica and Sonera was considered as a dream team due to its strength and innovativeness. 
The prevailing assumption was that the technology and services develop fast and the urge 
towards the German market led the decision-making. Board member E and manager F remind 
that the urge towards the German market was substantially higher than what the final licence 
fee indicates: Sonera’s limit was three times bigger, some 12 billion, than Sonera’s share of 
the final fee. (Interviewee E, board member; Interviewee F, manager.) In addition, prior to 
obtaining the German licence Sonera had closed a successful deal in the US, which 
encouraged Sonera to take part in the auction in Germany. (Interviewee A, manager.) 
Nevertheless, the financial market perceived the fee paid higher than expected. Analyst G 
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states that the investors were concerned that the additional investments would keep on 
burdening the company – only putting a cap on the investments would stop the market value 
reduction. (Interviewee G, analyst.) In public, Sonera was blamed for not having executed 
enough risk assessment. Board member E argues that Sonera had made detailed and 
professional analyses in which resources were balanced. However, he admits that the 
investments were calculated inaccurately. (Interviewee E, board member.) As the crisis 
deepened, the asset prices dropped to one tenth of their value, which complicated the 
refinancing the following year. (Interviewee F, manager; Interviewee G, analyst.) Manager 
F’s quotation below indicates Sonera’s invincible trust in the German acquisition. 
“The financing seemed to be in order, I’m emphasizing the words seemed to be in 
order.“ (Interviewee F, manager) 
 
The investment story components indicate that Sonera was still in hype mindset. The tone of 
the third quarter interim report is considerably more positive than the tone ratio of the 
previous quarter. Also, the tone of future prospects becomes more positive. The interview 
evidence supports the tone ratios; Sonera was aiming at influencing the investors’ perception. 
Despite the negative market sentiment, Sonera had strong belief in the German market. Time 
focus that shades into past signifies that Sonera was concentrating on disclosing information 
about the events already occurred – in the interim report Sonera concentrates to explain the 
acquisition. The examination of causal statements indicates that uncertainties exist: the level 
of internal causal statements increases. Manager A explains that the bad business decision – 
the UMTS acquisitions – took place in a situation where the market had given positive 
feedback about the growth. Sonera acknowledged that the growth would not maintain at the 
same  level  with  the  past  decades  but  at  least  they  would  stay  in  the  top  of  development.  
(Interviewee  A,  manager.)  The  quotation  of  manager  A  sums  up  the  result  of  the  UMTS  
licence auction in Germany.  
“Yes, we won the auction and sometime it happens that when you win the auction you 
lose the game, and that’s what happened.” (Interviewee A, manager)  
 
The  ex  post  management  quotations  reflect  the  positivity  of  the  interim  report.  Both  of  the  
two articles discussing the issue are positive in nature and seek to convince the investors that 
Sonera is now better off. Sonera’s acting deputy CEO at the time, Kaj-Erik Relander, 
comments the company’s expansion in the European market and the licence price in 
Helsingin Sanomat and in Kauppalehti. He rationalizes the possibilities brought by the 
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geographical choice and the final price paid of the licence in Germany. The articles reflect 
Sonera’s high expectations of the licence auctions and that the company did not see the 
acquisition as a bad deal. 
“We are very pleased. Sonera has now foothold on the biggest single European market 
with vast development potential.” (Helsingin Sanomat 18.8.2000) 
 
“The licence price was a positive surprise and of course being part until the end of the 
auction signals that the price was at the correct level the whole time.” (Kauppalehti 
18.8.2000) 
 
5.2.7 Redefined strategy 
“It was total confuse and those people who had been doing that did not anymore see 
any potential to go to the investors and tell the story because no one really wanted to 
hear that anymore.” (Interviewee E, board member) 
 
During the fall 2000, the acceptance of UMTS investments became strongly critical and the 
market reaction was hostile to every new UMTS investment. To investors, Sonera was 
explaining how investments in services, in bigger markets, and in transforming already 
realized potential of 2G-networks into 3G-networs were necessary. Already during 1999 there 
were some contradictions between the two organizational layers in the company: managers 
and employees. Deteriorating market confidence in Sonera entailed turbulence among the 
leading team of the organization. (Interviewee E, board member.) Part of the team began 
slowing down the UMTS fuss during the fall when the other part was still lobbying for the 3G 
saying that standing aside would be a big mistake. (Interviewee A, manager.) Interviewee A 
criticises the lobbying part of the management: 
“When the capital market is so strongly against this the top management needs to 
react.” (Interviewee A, manager) 
 
Finally, on October 23, 2000 Sonera announced its redefined UMTS strategy concentrating 
on already acquired licences on the Baltic area and on minor holdings in other European 
markets. (Sonera 2000) Through this action Sonera was seeking to influence the share price in 
the market. The redefined strategy anticipates Sonera’s new strategy in one year’s time. The 
interview evidence shows that the company did not perpetrate disclosing false information, 
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action that is claimed to be used during the hype. (Interviewee G, analyst.) Manager F says he 
trusted the accuracy of reported information due to internal control mechanisms. In fact, at the 
time, Sonera developed control systems when preparing for the upcoming merger. Manager F 
recognizes the importance of the new strategy on market sentiment. 
“How the road show on October 2000 influenced the market, and the new cautious 
strategy. Well, it slowed down the share price decline. It was a fair but inadequate 
action.” (Interviewee F, manager) 
 
The redefined strategy did not have a positive influence on the tone ratio, which becomes 
more negative in comparison to the previous quarter. Also the time focus ratio continues 
descending towards the past-end of the scale. These reflect the issue in quotation of manager 
F, who says that the strategy change was not an adequate measure to improve the company’s 
situation. Nevertheless, the tone ratio of future prospects continues the increasing trend – 
Sonera is aiming at changing the investors’ perception of the company’s future. As expected, 
the level of internal causal statements increase, which indicates Sonera’s retreating market 
value.  
 
Sonera’s redefined strategy was also written about in the press right after announcement. The 
main message in ex post statements in the articles is the risks concerning the UMTS 
investments. Sonera’s CEO and deputy CEO comment critically the states’ additional fees 
and consequently rationalize the decision of the new strategic direction. Sonera’s management 
explain the basis of the strategy especially with external causes such as negative market 
sentiment. They do not make bones about the riskiness of the investments but highlight the 
political and financial change in the business environment. The overall tone of the articles is 
somewhat negative reflecting the tone of the year-end report. Despite the negative feeling in 
the ex post statements, the management is also aiming at softening the belly-landing of the 
UMTS investments by adding a positive side to the adventure in Germany. This is, however, 
only a small positive addition compared to the rest of the quotations. Company’s 
responsibility to the financial market is emphasized in the second quotation below where 
Sonera opens up its new and more cautious direction of UMTS investments. 
“Even if the deal with Deutsche Telecom had been cancelled we would still be 
significantly stronger and more developed company.” (Helsingin Sanomat 24.10.2000) 
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 “In addition, we participate selectively and with small portions in other European 
markets. We will not attend the French licence competition and we consider 
Switzerland critically.” (Taloussanomat 24.10.2000) 
 
5.2.8 Failed merger attempt with Swedish Telia 
Manager A discusses the first attempts of a merger between Sonera and Swedish telecom 
operator Telia. The third, and last, of these attempts took place in January 2001. The merger 
was, however, rejected by the Finnish government. (Interviewee B, manager.) According to 
manager A, Prime Minister Lipponen was the force behind the rejection because he was 
afraid of a political scandal to arise if the merger happened. Sonera’s CEO, Mr Relander, had 
suggested a 40–60 ownership division in the new company, head office located in Stockholm. 
Sweden had not concluded the decision on selling its entire holding of Telia and the Finnish 
government regarded any state ownership as risky; cash flows would have been directed to 
Sweden. By this time Finland had already decided on selling the remaining Sonera shares to 
the public. (TeliaSonera history.) 
 
Manager  A  states  that  in  the  beginning  of  2001  Sonera  was  a  stronger  company  than  Telia  
and if the merger had taken place as planned Sonera would have been better off. The deal 
would have allowed Sonera to finance international operations without direct access to the 
capital market. (Interviewee A, manager.) Sonera’s strong position did not remain throughout 
the year. In annual report of 2001 it is stated that the company’s year was shaded with strong 
value decrease. (Sonera 2001.) 
“The expectations were high all over, so if the reality is like this then this is not going to 
work.” (Interviewee A, manager) 
 
The merger plans are in accordance with the prevailing market trend of consolidation. 
Interviewee A remembers that Sonera had preliminary merger negotiations also with other 
European operators in case that the Telia merger would backfire. Negotiation partners were, 
among others, Vodafone, T-Mobile and Orange. Individual operators were aware that 
surviving in the market would be difficult alone. Finally, even though the third merger 
attempt failed, the interviewees do not mention any further negotiations taken place between 
Sonera and any of other operators. 
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The failure does not change the direction of the tone ratio development, which retains its 
declining trend towards negative. Tone ratio of future prospects sections remains at the level 
of the previous year confirming the company’s perception of the future. Time focus, on the 
other hand, changes into more future oriented. Even though the merger with Telia was 
rejected the other, albeit preliminary, negotiations with other European operators upgrade the 
future orientation. The time focus ratio of the first quarter of 2001 is the closest to the future 
of all quarters under review. The increasing level of external causal statements suggests that 
the company’s situation in the market has become less distressing.   
 
5.2.9 Bottom of the share price 
The bottom of the share price dive took place on September 21, 2001. Due to continuous 
decline in the share price development trend, Sonera had commenced downscaling actions 
earlier in September at the same time with new CEO Harri Koponen starting in his new 
position. The efficiency-boosting program aimed at increase in profitability, which is the 
basis of the new strategy announced in October the same year. Analyst G points out in his 
interview that at the time of the bottom the companies were in a really bad shape. He 
emphasizes that Sonera was not the only company the share price of which reached the 
bottom around the same time. The market values of new technology companies and 
telecommunications operators behaved similarly during and in the aftermath of the hype. 
“The share price dropped below the normal level. The companies were in extremely 
bad shape.” (Interviewee G, analyst) 
 
The investment story components of the third quarter interim report of 2001 are linked to the 
share price dive. The declining tone ratio of disclosure reflects the fall and bottom of the share 
price but at the time of the disclosure in October 2001 the recovery has begun. The tone ratio 
of future prospects section, being +1 and thus extremely positive, indicates the more positive 
future ahead. Also, the time focus of the disclosure increases rather significantly compared to 
the previous quarter indicating, in addition to the more stable future, the new strategy 
disclosed the following day. However, the level of internal causal statements increases 
signifying that the company is still struggling in the crisis situation – the situation is not yet 
recovered.  
 
 
78?
?
5.2.10 New strategy 
On October 1, 2001 Harri Koponen was appointed CEO and on October 23 Sonera announced 
the new strategy. The business environment and the market sentiment had permanently 
changed from growth towards profitability and Sonera was to adapt to the new situation. 
These changes are the background force for the strategy. (Sonera 2001.) The capital market 
had an influence on the formation of the new strategy through changing market expectations 
and prevailing market situation. Manager A concludes that sudden changes from growth 
strategy into a profitability strategy are significant and the company needs to work hard to 
rebuild the trust. (Interviewee A, manager.)  
 
Despite the new strategy’s positive nature and positive market reaction, the positivity does not 
carry until the year-end report. The tone of the disclosure declines to negative and also the 
tone of the future prospects section decreases. Time focus ratio behaves similarly with tone 
ratio and becomes more past oriented. Causal statements remain unchanged. New strategy 
does not seem to have an influence on the investment story of the fourth quarter. What rather 
can explain the development of the investment story components are the low but more stable 
share  price  development  and  the  lay-offs  resulting  from  the  new  strategy  based  efficiency-
boosting program that began already during the third quarter of the year.  
 
The new strategy limited the amount of UMTS investments and directs the company’s focus 
to profitability. The benefits of new strategy will realize later in the future which explains the 
past orientation of the year-end report. There are also disadvantages in respect of the new 
strategy lay-offs being one of the most discussed disadvantages. Sonera began downscaling 
its operations already in September when preparing the strategic changes by announcing 
cuttings in labour years. Manager A remembers how the trade union was expecting the lay-
offs “and that’s what caused all the fuss”. The interviewees mainly concentrate on the 
necessity of the downscaling actions but the press discusses both sides of the facts; the 
management explains and defends especially the labour negotiations. With the efficiency-
boosting program, the company was seeking significant cost savings and increase in 
profitability. In the quotation below Sonera’s president of the board Tapio Hintikka explains 
the giving of employee notice in Taloussanomat in late August. 
“It is clear that with this high amount of employees the situation cannot be solved 
through internal arrangements and retirement.” (Taloussanomat 24.8.2001)  
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News articles cover different aspects of the new strategy. Sonera’s acting CEO at the time, 
Harri Koponen, comments the strategy in three different newspapers. The articles concentrate 
on the reasons behind the new strategy, such as the reduction of employment years, and not 
the consequences. The statements in Helsingin Sanomat on October 23 are the most negative 
leaving the future uncertain.  
“No one can promise anything.” (Helsingin Sanomat 23.10.2001) 
 
The articles in Taloussanomat and Kauppalehti are less negative and more future minded. 
Especially the Kauppalehti article concentrates on the client aspect of the new strategy, that is, 
“creating a clear interface between Sonera and the client in all services”. (Kauppalehti 
23.10.2001) The management quotations in these articles reflect the future orientation of the 
year-end report. Even though the tone of these quotations is defensive and realistic the 
negativity of the year-end report is not, however, mediated through these statements. 
Especially in Taloussanomat (23.10.2001), CEO Harri Koponen excuses the new revised 
UMTS  strategy  with  “delayed introduction of new technology and commercialization”. 
Considering the tone, the ex post management quotations reflect the more positive approach 
of the future prospects section as the quotation below presents.  
“Sonera will not become a department store; we need to adhere to innovativeness.” 
(Kauppalehti 23.10.2001) 
 
During the early fourth quarter the ex post management quotations were realistic with positive 
shading. Article published in Kauppalehti on February 7, 2002 continues discussing the new 
strategy. Three months after the prior ex post statements the tone has changed to more 
negative now supporting the negativity of the year-end report. The company states the reality 
of the current, new, and still unstable situation that directs the company towards the upcoming 
merger. The difference between the quotation below and the quotations above can be 
explained with the release date. In October the company had just disclosed its new strategy 
whereas in February the company disclosed its final result for 2001. The new strategy had 
been in action for some months and Sonera had gotten experience of where it will lead the 
company. In addition, the quotation below indicates that the hype-based mindset has finally 
been abandoned.  
“The growth will not reach the level we anticipated few years back. We will not count 
on hype.” (Kauppalehti 7.2.2002) 
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5.2.11 Merger with Telia 
The TeliaSonera merger was announced on March 26, 2002. Already at the time of the UMTS 
licence acquisitions in 2001 the European market believed in major consolidation. The 
telecommunications operators realized that the market was too large to conquer alone. 
Sonera’s share price development had settled down as of 2001, which provided trust to the 
market. The tone ratio of disclosure becomes more positive and the tone of prospects remains 
unchanged. The time focus ratio increases moving closer to the future orientation. Also the 
internal causal statements continue increasing indicating that the company perceives the crisis 
not yet being beaten. Finally, the consolidation was only a part of the hype and did not arrive 
in expected scale. (Interviewee B, manager.) 
“Telia and Sonera are almost the only cross border merger that has taken place. […] 
Which [belief of only two or three big market players] of course added to the valuation 
of the hype.” (Interviewee B, manager) 
 
Interviewee E, the board member, describes how Telia gave a strong picture of itself but in 
the end the company was in financial trouble. Telia’s weak situation explains the increase in 
internal causal statements, that is, despite positive future outlook some uncertainties 
considering the future remain. The interviewees (E, C) argue that the merger had become a 
weaker deal compared to the previous attempts. These statements are contradictory with the 
investment  story  components  that  all  get  more  positive.  When  the  two  companies  were  
planning the merger, the perception of Telia’s financial standing was different in Telia’s 
managers and Telia’s board of directors.  
“They had six hour meeting but the story what was told to the board was completely 
different what he saw when he was preparing himself to be the CEO for the company. 
That’s the Swedish way of running the company, state-owned.” (Interviewee E, board 
member) 
 
The decisions made during the UMTS period have an impact on TeliaSonera today. 
Interviewee A says that Sonera’s fundamental business was effective, international 
investments were mainly successful, and the company was innovative. (Interviewee A, 
manager.) 
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5.2.12 UMTS write-offs 
Before writing off the UMTS investments in Germany and Italy on July 25, 2002, Sonera had 
executed regular impairment testing for the licences already in 2001. No grounds for the 
impairment existed before the second quarter of 2002. (Sonera 2001–2002.) When Sonera 
began the impairment testing the aim was at focusing and guaranteeing the cash flow and that 
the people inside the organization did not have too high expectations. What is notable is that 
Sonera was not the only telecommunications operator writing off the licence investments. 
During the first years of the 2000s, also Spanish Telefónica and Orange from Great Britain 
wrote off significant amounts. (Interviewee E, board member.) Group 3G who possessed the 
licence in Germany changed its UMTS strategy and decided to wind up the business due to 
poor future outlook. Sonera, holding only a minority in the joint venture, was able to 
eliminate the extra burden caused by the licences. Telefónica, Sonera’s partner in the German 
auction, took the responsibility and thus carried the risks in Germany as the major 
shareholder. After the write-off the future of Sonera turned bright. Manager B states that 
before the write-off was executed “it was the whole consensus starting to change like month 
after month, you don’t see the development of the data uses and so on. It happened pretty 
quickly.” (Interviewee B, manager.) 
 
The interviews reveal that the impairment tests and the write-off were not a surprise to the 
market. It was rather a question of whether to write off the whole investment or only part of it. 
In the early 2000s the impairments received a positive market reaction because “it clears the 
risk table”. (Interviewee B, manager.) This was also the case with Sonera; the market reaction 
was positive as can be identified in Appendix 1. Not only was the market reaction positive to 
the write-off. Sonera was disclosing in a more positive manner. Tone of disclosure and tone 
of future prospects section become more positive and time focus moves closer to the future. 
Especially the future prospects section gets a significantly more positive tone compared to the 
previous quarters of the year. The company was finally ready for the future in Nordic 
cooperation and the UMTS adventure was concluded. 
“It was part of the story that this company can survive.” (Interviewee E, board 
member) 
 
The board member E’s comment about the survival and the increasing appearance of causal 
statements are in line with findings of Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992). They find that when the 
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company has survived from a crisis it discloses more external issues than internal issues. The 
increase in internal causal statements is significant from the year-end report of 2001 to the 
third quarter interim report of 2002. The level of internal causal statements is high also in 
2000 when Sonera took corrective measures to slow down the share price dive. The 
significant increase in internal causal statements implies that the company perceives its 
position in the environment and its situation as a company uncertain. 
 
Two articles have features of ex post management and they both discuss the write-off. 
Sonera’s deputy CEO Aimo Eloholma comments the announced write-off in Kauppalehti. He 
corrects the rumour that the write-offs of companies possessing licences in Germany would 
have been agreed on. He emphasizes that when the impairment tests are conducted in the 
given situation by professionals and by the book the outcome is and ought to be similar.  
“For long there has been pressure to execute the write-offs. It was good that the action 
was taken simultaneously so that no additional pressure was put to the other party.” 
(Kauppalehti 26.7.2002) 
 
The CEO of Sonera at the time, Harri Koponen, and the CFO Kim Ignatius comment the 
original planning of the UMTS project in Taloussanomat when interviewed about the second 
quarter result. The significant change in the business environment is highlighted when 
rationalizing the process from high expectations to auctions and further to the write-offs. The 
quotations in the articles are slightly more positive and instead of only stating the necessary 
they give reasons. The nature of these ex post statements is more declarative than persuasive 
because the share price development at the time had already settled down and the market 
reaction had been positive in similar cases in Europe. With the explaining comments Sonera 
seeks to give a positive picture about need and demand for the write-off. 
“The project was not planned carelessly. When entering the UMTS business the 
situation was very different. It’s easy to say afterwards that the decision was right or 
wrong.” (Taloussanomat 26.7.2002)  
 
“The development of the mobile market in Germany is the slowest in Europe and 
launching the operations have not progressed as wished.” (Taloussanomat 26.7.2002) 
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5.3 Summary of Sonera’s investment story development 
Sonera’s investment story development is investigated through four components: tone, time 
focus, causal statements and ex post interpretation management. Tone and causal statements 
are identified as main components and in seven cases out of eleven they develop reversely. 
Tone ratio gets its most positive values during 1999 and late 2000. The most negative values 
appear during 2001, the year-end report having the only negative tone during the review 
period. When the tone is positive, Sonera is mediating a contrary story through causal 
statements. External causal statements are the highest during the late 1999 and early 2000, 
and during the three last quarters of 2001. Time focus is not a significant component in 
investment story development. Especially, when the future prospects sections are excluded, 
the variation in time focus is minor. Time focus rather gives insight into the level of 
explaining past events versus future events. Due to the nature of interim report, they explain 
mainly past events.  
 
Several interviewees discuss the cooling down measures, that is, how Sonera was aiming at 
settling down the share price boost and after slowing down the dive. The tone ratio, especially 
the tone of future prospects section is identified as means of cooling down the extreme market 
behaviour. Out of the eleven events, the two endogenous events relating to strategy changes 
express how the investment story can be different in similar situations. In other words, even 
though the events are similar the investment story is constructed in relation to its context that 
is, the prevailing business environment. 
 
This research indicates that the appearance of internal and external causal statements 
measures well how the company perceives its market situation. Also ex post interpretation 
management in newspaper articles concentrates on the years of the deepest crisis. As Gibbins, 
Richardson, and Waterhouse (1990; 1992) suggest, increase in external causal statements 
implies that the company is more certain about its position and its future. During the hype of 
1999, before the IT-bubble was evident and recognized by the company, Sonera used more 
external causal statements. Around 2000–2001 when the share price first reached its peak and 
then crashed, the level of internal causal statements increases signifying more uncertain 
period. When the share price reaches the bottom, the level of external causal statements 
begins increasing again implying that the bottom was expected. The uncertain phase at the 
time of the TeliaSonera merger is characterized by varying increase and decline of causal 
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statements. More importantly, the events analysed support the investment story development 
in this respect. 
 
The research indicates a link between the events and the investment story development. 
Sonera adapted the investment story to the prevailing situations. The interviewees discuss 
mainly the same events, also a non-disclosed one. The analysed events match well with the 
findings of investment story component examination. The most discussed events are the two 
periods of hype of which each interviewee has one’s own perspective. The biggest differences 
in the interview evidence are in timing. The interviewees placed same events even to different 
years. The most significant difference in interview evidence is the contradictions in analyst 
and managers’ opinions about who is to blame for the hype. The analyst states that companies 
were overly optimistic in their disclosure and the managers argue that analysts were 
publishing false valuations. There were also some disagreements whether the NASDAQ 
listing was a wise move. The least discussed events, on the other hand, are the bottom of the 
share price and the failed merger that are both discussed only by one interviewee. All in all, 
the investment story analysis points out factors influencing the company’s perception in the 
market and demonstrates the importance of considering investment story management as part 
of the disclosure strategy.  
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6 Discussion 
Previous literature on investment story from the fields of accounting and business 
communications has mainly investigated companies under normal circumstances (see e.g. 
Gibbins et al. 1990; Gibbins et al. 1992; Jameson 2000; Beattie et al. 2004; Rutherford 2005). 
Henry (2008), on the other hand, has examined IT and telecommunications companies’ 
disclosures in the dot-com bubble, 1998–2002. This thesis is conducted using only one case 
company and thus provides interesting and more detailed observations that are consistent with 
the previous research, especially Henry’s (2008) and Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992). The 
findings of this thesis suggest that a crisis company’s investment story management does not 
significantly differ from the investment story management under normal circumstances. 
However, in uncertain circumstances the investment story development is quicker, more 
reactive, and more volatile. Sonera’s cooling down actions signify a rather reactive approach 
to disclosure. 
 
As a case company, Sonera is a book example of a dot-com crisis company. Sonera’s share 
price development follows the hype curve modelled by Gartner Group (see e.g. Fenn & 
Raskino 2008), the liberalization process did not progress as planned, the expectations about 
the future remained high in the company despite the sudden share price retreat, Sonera 
invested significant amounts in the new technology, and finally suffered significant losses. 
The characteristics of the bubble are evident in this study in both analyses: investment story 
components and events. During the bubble, companies mimicked the innovators in the 
industry and their reaction to movements and changes in institutional environment was 
strategic influencing the investment storylines. (Dahlgren & Hørlück 2001; Miller 2009; Cole 
2001; Holland 2005.) Especially the analyst interviewed focused on Sonera’s tendency to 
disclose too optimistic information thus increasing cost to investors and other stakeholders 
who needed to filter the groundless information from the fair. The information cost plays a 
significant role also in previous literature. (Gibbins et al. 1990; Gibbins et al. 1992; Palepu & 
Healy 2001, Holland 1998.) 
 
The theoretical framework applied in this research is based on the context model of Gibbins et 
al. (1990; 1992). The model does not recognize the uniqueness of crisis situations but the 
disclosure position determines the company’s expected response to a disclosure issue under 
normal circumstances. The empirical analysis in this study is distinguished from the original 
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also what comes to the research material. Gibbins et al. (1990) use letters to shareholders 
whereas this research applies interim and year-end reports. Letters to shareholders are 
problematic due to their once a year appearance. Annual reports only gather the information 
published during the financial year and thus contain no new information to investors who 
make their investment decisions based on more frequently disclosed information. Interim 
reports provide a more detailed picture of the investment story development by including 
information that is new to investors. (Virtanen 2010; Ikäheimo 1996.) The results indicate that 
interim reports change greatly from one quarter to another when observed from the 
investment story components’ point of view.  
 
Gibbins et al. (1990) found that 61 per cent of points in their study had shading in tone or 
explicit  causality.  In  this  thesis  the  equivalent  percentage  is  only  45,  which  points  out  the  
firm-specific nature of the study method also identified by Gibbins et al. (1990). The 
difference can also be explained with Sonera’s crisis situation and different research material. 
Letters to shareholders used by Gibbins et al. (1990) are more descriptive and subjective in 
content than interim reports.  
 
In the findings, tone rises as central component influencing the investor behaviour. This is 
consistent with findings of Henry (2008). The mean of the tone ratio in Henry’s research is 
0.568 and median 0.600. The mean and median in this research are slightly lower, mean being 
0.477 and median 0.530. The difference in calculating the tone ratio and also different 
research material explain the differences. Henry (2008) uses earnings press releases and 
calculates the tone ratio with positive and negative words whereas in this research positive 
and negative points are applied in accordance with Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992). Rutherford 
(2005) found that especially annual reports tend to have general bias towards positive 
language. The same trend is reflected also in Sonera’s interim reports with one exception, the 
fourth quarter of 2001, which gets a negative tone ratio. According to the results, the language 
in interim reports is positive but does not reach the positivity of annual reports and earnings 
press releases. This suggests that interim reports during the UMTS licence acquisitions were 
more objective in respect of tone.  
 
Out  of  the  investment  story  components  taken  into  account  in  this  study,  the  analysis  of  
causal statements seems to be in line with Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992). A contradiction is 
observed between the appearance of external causal statements and tone. Previous research 
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does not take into account the relations of different components or their role in the formation 
of investment story. Notable, in seven events out of eleven analysed the tone and external 
causal statements develop reversely. The data indicate that, when measured with causal 
statements, Sonera perceived having the best situation from the business perspective from the 
fourth quarter of 2000 until the end of 2001. During that time the share price development 
was weak, time focus the most past oriented, and tone closest to the negative. Sonera believed 
in market consolidation and UMTS investments. In addition, the new strategy limiting new 
investments increased Sonera’s confidence in business decisions. The finding suggests that 
disclosing external issues does not only describe the company’s survival from a crisis as 
suggested by Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992) but also internally perceived stability and 
predictability of company’s future. The data also indicate that the more difficult the quarter in 
respect of share price development, the less the company tends to explain.  
 
The investment story analysis suggests that during the dot-com bubble Sonera strove for 
influencing the share price development. Especially the cooling down measures taken during 
the hype in order to stabilize the expectation boost prove the accuracy of the grounded theory 
based context model of Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992). Even though the interviewees place the 
slowing down actions to year 2000 the results depict that Sonera was taking corrective actions 
until the end of the review period. The research also indicates that in downturn it appears to 
be difficult to improve the share price even if the company would disclose positive news and 
have a positive and future oriented investment story. In upturn, however, it is easier for the 
company to boost the good share price development. This finding is slightly contradictory 
with  findings  of  Henry  (2008)  who  argues  that  until  some  point  positive  tone  increases  the  
market reaction of positive earnings announcements. Sonera reported increasing revenues 
during the entire review period. Despite the revenue increase Sonera began showing loss in 
late 2001. Sonera’s share price had already crashed almost two years earlier. The profit and 
profitability declines were mainly explained with positive issues such as investments in new 
businesses and research and development.  
 
Henry (2008) found that profitable firms have shorter earnings press releases. When 
comparing the report lengths and appearance of internal and external causal statements, they 
give somewhat similar results. The highest percentages of external causal statements and 
shortest report lengths appear in periods from the second quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 
2000, excluding the fourth quarter of 1999, and from the first quarter of 2001 to the third 
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quarter of 2001. This congruence gives proof of the applicability of causal statements as 
measures of internally perceived company performance also in crisis situation, not only under 
normal circumstances as suggested by Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992). 
 
The event analysis provides evidence about the linkage of events and investment story 
development. Gibbins et al. (1990) argue that different strategic choices demand for different 
kind of information and disclosure. Especially observing the two endogenous events relating 
to changes in company strategy support the statement and provide interesting results that well 
describe the contradiction between investor beliefs and Sonera’s perceptions. When the 
strategy was first redefined in 2000 Sonera was aiming at positively influencing the investors. 
The high level of internal causal statements implies, however, something different. The action 
was rather an attempt to positively influence the investors even though Sonera perceived its 
situation in the market unstable. One year later, when the strategy was renewed more 
thoroughly the tone was negative but the level of external causal statements highest in the 
review period.  
 
Investment story has a significant role in building strategic credibility. (Higgins & Bannister 
1992, Mazzola et al. 2006.) The interview evidence suggests that Sonera’s credibility suffered 
from the crisis not only due to the overall market situation but also due to an unstable 
investment story. Sonera’s storyline changes dramatically, especially tone changes from 
overly positive to negative during a short period of time. The market did not believe in 
Sonera’s possibilities in the UMTS competition but Sonera’s perception of itself was strong. 
In order to maintain credibility, Sonera’s tone of future prospects section got highly positive 
values especially during the share price retreat. Even though Sonera made effort in 
influencing the investor behaviour, the overall negative market sentiment negatively affected 
Sonera’s efforts. It can be concluded that by means of investment story it is easier to boost the 
share price increase than slow down the retreat.  
 
Another interesting event relates to the UMTS game introduced by van Damme (2002). The 
game-like situation and learning how to play it became evident also in the interviews. The 
companies learned that they could not survive alone in the competition and began searching 
for partners of cooperation. Cole (2001) and Stienstra et al. (2004) argue that companies did 
not  disclose  M&A  plans  until  the  deal  was  closed.  Sonera  did  behave  similarly  with  its  
merger plans with Telia. The failed merger does not change significantly the investment story 
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development. The most interesting aspect is the time focus that is the most future oriented of 
the review period. Due to non-disclosure of the event, Sonera was strongly focusing on the 
future also the effect of time focus of future prospects section being relatively low.  
 
In uncertain situations investor behaviour is challenging to forecast. (Stienstra et al. 2004; 
Fenn & Raskino 2008.) Under normal circumstances, companies can disclose more 
proactively the investor behaviour being more stable and easier to forecast. In uncertain 
situations the disclosure actions are more reactive. Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992) model 
presents the company’s disclosure process as proactive, proactivity defined as company being 
actively present in the financial markets and carefully planning its disclosure activity in 
accordance with its disclosure strategy. (Virtanen 2010.) This thesis gives proof that in crisis 
situation, even though the disclosure strategy is proactive, the company needs to react fast to 
changing environment and investor behaviour, and the disclosure activity gets more reactive 
characteristics. However, the results do not significantly vary from the results of previous 
research, which implies that Sonera was able to follow the proactive disclosure strategy also 
in the unstable crisis situation. 
 
The proactive and reactive disclosure reaction derives from learning from market reactions to 
previous disclosure (Gibbins et al. 1990; 1992). Sonera’s disclosure position changes also due 
to learning from the capital market feedback. As a result of the learning process company 
might begin, for example, avoiding negative market reactions. (Holland 2005; Graham et al 
2006; Suijs 2007.) Especially the long lasting cooling down and slowing down actions 
identified in event analysis and verified by tone ratio analysis are a result of a learning 
process. The interview evidence reveals that when Sonera realized the bubble formation it 
began taking measures to flatter the peak in the share price development. At the same time the 
company was planning measures to proactively react to evident retreat and slow down the 
dive. Fast and significant changes in tone ratio development reflect the reactivity in disclosure 
strategy. When Sonera was aiming at slowing down the share price retreat it was disclosing 
what it expected the market wanting to read. The measures include telling less about the 
future and not disclosing anything that would boost the optimistic future prospects. Sonera 
was listening to the market (Sälli 2010). 
 
According to Gibbins et al. (1990; 1992), disclosure position is influenced by the extent of 
internal agreement through disclosure subunit status. The problematic decision-making 
90?
?
process is also acknowledged by Brunsson (1982) who argues that decisions are often 
completed based on biased information and improper weighing. The company’s decision-
making process, indeed, always leaves out some perceptions of group members. The 
perceptions are thus reduced and the disclosure finally includes a biased view of the 
disclosure issue and based on this biased information the investors make their investment 
decisions. (Brunsson 1982.) The research evidence depicts how contradictions inside the 
company influence the disclosure. The interview evidence points out contradictions inside 
Sonera. These contradictions, evidently, are not apparent in interim reports or written down in 
newspaper articles. These disagreements might have influenced the process of disclosure 
management, especially the reversal development of tone and level of external causal 
statements. The interim reports can thus include information that does not reflect the 
perception of the company but of some managers only. Consequently, the investment story 
might be distorted and not give a true picture of how the company would like to be seen in the 
market.  
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7 Conclusion 
This master’s thesis examines the development of the Finnish telecommunications company 
Sonera’s investment story during the UMTS crisis in 1999–2002. The objectives are to 
identify how the investment story developed and to what extent the events that occurred 
during the review period influenced the development. At the time, Sonera experienced 
extensive hype around its products and invested several billion euros in expensive UMTS 
licences in five countries. At the end of the review period, in July 2002, Sonera executed a 
complete write-off of two licences.  
 
7.1 Summary of findings 
The research provides evidence about the importance of considering the interpretation 
management factors in company’s disclosure strategy. In addition, the research indicates that 
in crisis situation the company can still engage in proactive disclosure strategy but the 
investment story management process gets more reactive, quick and volatile features. The 
uncertain investor behaviour leads to changing disclosure position and to reactivity. The case 
study setting and context provide an adequate base for the research. The case example is 
unique in nature, which makes it interesting to examine. Thus, the findings of this study 
provide some perspective to other unique and current cases such as the hype around 
Facebook.  
 
The theoretical framework applied is Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992) model that recognizes the 
disclosure management context, the disclosure management actions and the final output. 
Also, the existence of investment story in every stage of the model is identified in the 
framework. Despite the fact that Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992) model has been built based on 
evidence from companies operating under normal circumstances, the research proves the 
applicability of the framework when examining the investment story development in crisis 
circumstances such as Sonera’s. Even though challenging as Gibbins et al. (1992) suggest, ex 
ante and ex post management factors are reflected in texts. The research suggests that during 
the dot-com bubble, Sonera strove for influencing the share price development: to cut the 
peak of the hype and the bottom of the dive. According to the framework, companies learn 
from previous disclosures and especially under uncertain circumstances the disclosure is more 
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reactive. There is evidence that Sonera’s management was considering what and how to 
disclose.  
 
Different investment story components have a different influence on the development of 
investment story. The results show that the more unstable the company’s situation on the 
market the more the disclosures have internal causal statements and the more the company 
has ex post management. Tone is the component that most evidently aims at influencing the 
investors. Time focus indicates to what extent the company discloses about occurred events 
and future expectations and is not recognized as a significant factor when measuring 
investment story. Causal statements describe the company’s perception of its situation and 
position on the market. Ex post interpretation management in newspapers grows alongside 
with company’s distress.  
 
Tone and causal statements are identified as the most significant components. The overall 
tone of disclosure shades into more negative from 1999 to 2001. In 2002, the tone begins 
shading into more positive. During 2001, the future is identified as extremely positive. Causal 
statements, on the other hand, depict the company’s situation being better in 1999 and 2001, 
which is in contradiction with tone. Especially during the hype of 1999 and 2000 Sonera was 
aiming at influencing first the share price increase and then the share price crash with tone, 
which is depicted as the easiest to format in the course of disclosure process. Time focus, on 
the other hand, indicates that Sonera was concentrating the most on past events during the 
UMTS crisis in 2000 and 2001. The findings indicate that in downturn it appears to be 
difficult to raise the share price even if the company would have a positive and future oriented 
investment story. In upturn, however, it is easier to boost the good share price development. 
In addition, the contradictions inside Sonera can be assumed to have had an influence on the 
objectivity of the disclosure.  
 
The event analysis shows that events did have an influence on the development of Sonera’s 
investment story. Especially endogenous events such as the changes in company strategy are 
depicted to have contradictory influence on the company’s storyline. The quotation below by 
Interviewee A (manager) describes Sonera’s management thoughts almost 10 years after the 
crisis and well sums up also the investment story development. 
“Yes, we won the auction and sometime it happens that when you win the auction you lose 
the game, and that’s what happened.”  
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7.2 Theoretical contribution 
There has been little research on investment story in the field of accounting. The previous 
research has mainly been genre and textual analysis. Case Sonera has been examined by Sälli 
(2010) and Vesterinen (2009). The theoretical framework applied in this thesis is based on the 
Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992) model that takes into account the complete disclosure 
management process under normal circumstances. This study proves the applicability of the 
seldom  used  model  also  in  cases  under  uncertain  and  crisis  situations.  In  addition,  the  
research material differs from the original study. Instead of letters to shareholders, more 
timely disclosures are applied in this thesis: interim reports and newspaper articles.  
 
The means of analysing the data combine two different approaches: context driven model and 
textual analysis based calculation method. The calculation method for tone of disclosure 
introduced by Henry (2008) is modified to fit to Gibbins’s et al. (1990; 1992) model. The 
calculation method is applied also to measure time focus. Despite the modification, the results 
are congruent with the previous research and imply that companies tend to behave somewhat 
similarly in normal and crisis situations. The case study method provides means to find more 
detailed explanations to investment story development. The explanations were sought by 
analysing events that were emphasized in the interviews.  
 
Previous research does not take into account the relations of different components or their role 
in the formation of investment story. This study combines and compares different investment 
story components. Especially the findings concerning the causal statements are interesting and 
complement the previous literature. This study gives proof of the applicability of causal 
statements as measures of internally perceived company performance also in crisis situation. 
External causal statements do not only describe the company’s survival from a crisis but also 
internally perceived stability and predictability of company’s future. Crisis situation is not 
that special from the investment story’s point of view. 
 
7.3 Practical and policy implications 
Even though the results are not generalizable due to the unique context factors and the fact 
that only one case company is used, based on the herd behaviour it can be proposed that the 
similar trend to influence the share price by managing disclosure applies also to other 
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companies in similar situations. For companies facing crisis, it is important to recognize the 
influence of the uncertain situation on disclosure credibility. In order to succeed in the 
investment story building, the company needs to consider the different building blocks in its 
disclosure strategy. A contradictory investment story has a negative influence on the company 
credibility in the market. The research indicates that in upturn it is easier to boost good share 
price development by means of investment story. In downturn, the improvement is more 
difficult even if the company would disclose positive news and have a positive and future 
oriented  investment  story.  The  success  of  the  disclosure  strategy  is  thus  dependent  on  the  
prevailing  market  situation  as  well  as  on  the  strength  of  the  strategy.  Sonera  was  able  to  
follow the proactive disclosure strategy also in unstable situation. 
 
Also the overall market sentiment has a significant role in the way companies are seen in the 
market. Thus, in the disclosure process, the information flows also to another direction – from 
the market to the company whose disclosure position changes due to learning from the capital 
market feedback. It is important to maintain a logical and stable investment story at the same 
time with reacting to market demands for disclosure. 
 
The third aspect influencing the investment story is the level of agreement among the 
company. Company decision-making process always leaves out some individual opinions and 
a biased view is mediated to the market. Contradictions are not written out in disclosures but 
they influence the process of disclosure management. Because tone and causal statements 
reflect different perspectives, contradictions result in contradictory development of the two 
components. Disclosure can thus include information that does not reflect company’s 
perception of the situation. Disagreements may result in distorted investment story.  
 
7.4 Limitations of the study 
This thesis includes some limitations. Due to the subjectivity of the research method, even 
though  an  agreement  level  test  is  applied,  the  results  might  be  somewhat  different  if  
conducted by another researcher. Because only one case company and phenomenon are 
investigated, the results of this thesis mainly provide understanding of how the investment 
story develops in respect of events taken place in the company and its environment. Also, the 
events chosen for the analysis are not the only events that took place during the period under 
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review and do not provide a complete set of explanations from the investment story’s point of 
view. 
 
Sonera is only one market player and its actions were influenced by other telecommunications 
companies  as  well  as  by  other  new  economy  companies.  The  research  environment  is  thus  
created in larger context and Sonera’s share price followed the prevailing trend – the herd 
behaviour occurred. Sonera’s actions to meet goals set in order to improve the share price 
development might not have had the desired influence due to information that the investors 
received from the telecommunications market as a whole.  
 
Interim reports provide only a glimpse to the disclosure array. This research does not take into 
account for example stock exchange releases that are amongst the timeliest disclosures. The 
results would be even more descriptive and detailed if the data was larger, containing also for 
example stock exchange releases. In addition, Sonera’s interim reports were published almost 
two months later than the events occurred, which means that the company had time to weigh 
words and prospects. In this respect, investigating stock exchange releases would provide 
even more timely insight into financial disclosure management decisions.  
 
7.5 Suggestions for future research 
The research raises several suggestions for future research. In the future, a research can be 
conducted with a quantitative research method by investigating the correlation between the 
share price development and investment story development. In this case, a larger data would 
provide  better  results.  Interim  reports  do  not  provide  a  full  picture  of  the  development  of  
investment story. Hence, also other more frequently disclosed publications such as stock 
exchange releases could be added in order to provide more detailed results. Also other 
European telecommunications companies could be included in the research in order to 
expound on what extent Sonera’s investment story develops in accordance with the peer 
group.  
 
In the discussion chapter, the influence of contradictions among the company management on 
disclosure objectivity is discussed. All views and opinions might not be listened to when 
preparing disclosures, especially when disagreements occur. The influence of contradictions 
on disclosure, investment story and investor behaviour would be interesting to examine. 
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APPENDIX 1.  
Sonera’s share price development and events chosen for the analysis. 
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APPENDIX 2. 
List of interviewees 
 
Interviewee Title Date Duration 
Interviewee A Operating manager 3.12.2009  
Interviewee B Operating manager 7.4.2010 40 min 
Interviewee C Operating manager 7.9.2010 1h 23min 
Interviewee D Operating manager 7.5.2010 1h 25min 
Interviewee E Board member 4.8.2010 1h 5min 
Interviewee F Operating manager 07.01.2010  
Interviewee G Analyst 25.11.2009  
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APPENDIX 3. 
List of written research material 
 
Report type Quarter Publication date 
Interim report 2nd quarter 1999 02.08.1999 
Interim report 3rd quarter 1999 25.10.1999 
Year-end report 1999 14.02.2000 
Interim report 1st quarter 2000 26.04.2000 
Interim report 2nd quarter 2000 24.07.2000 
Interim report 3rd quarter 2000 23.10.2000 
Year-end report 2000 12.02.2001 
Interim report 1st quarter 2001 25.04.2001 
Interim report 2nd quarter 2001 23.07.2001 
Interim report 3rd quarter 2001 22.10.2001 
Year-end report 2001 06.02.2002 
Interim report 1st quarter 2002 23.04.2002 
Interim report 2nd quarter 2002 25.07.2002 
Interim report 3rd quarter 2002 25.10.2002 
   
 
Newspaper Article name Publication date 
Helsingin sanomat Sonera sai Saksan-valloitukseen rahaa Turkista ja Yhdysvalloista 18.08.2000 
Helsingin sanomat Markkinat pakottivat Soneran painamaan jarrua umts-kisassa 24.10.2000 
Helsingin sanomat Sonera valitsi Nokian umts-verkkonsa toimijaksi 05.12.2000 
Helsingin sanomat Tietoenatorin osakkeiden myynti piti Soneran plussalla 26.04.2001 
Helsingin sanomat Sonera keskittyy nyt kotimaahan 23.10.2001 
Kauppalehti Sonera 21 miljardin investoinnilla Saksan matkapuhelinmarkkinoille 18.08.2000 
Kauppalehti Sonera odottaa Italian umts-luvan irtoavan halvalla 24.08.2000 
Kauppalehti Sonera nieli umts-intonsa 24.10.2000 
Kauppalehti Sonera varoitti, osake vajosi 09.04.2001 
Kauppalehti Soneran umts-kumppani julki syksyllä 24.07.2001 
Kauppalehti Sonera: 3G-yhteistyö helpottaa yhtiön rahoitusasemaa 17.09.2001 
Kauppalehti Koponen iski puumerkkinsä strategiaan 23.10.2001 
Kauppalehti Soneran tekemä 3G-rajais koskee myös Turkkia ja Baltiaa 25.10.2001 
Kauppalehti Sonera uudistaa keväällä jälleen strategiansa 07.02.2002 
Kauppalehti Umts-seikkailu maksoi Soneralle yli neljä miljardia 26.07.2002 
Taloussanomat Sonera jarruttaa rynnistystä umts-verkkoihin 24.10.2000 
Taloussanomat Sonera kertoi yllättäen odotettua huonommasta tuloksesta 19.01.2001 
Taloussanomat Sonera karsii rajusti väkeään 24.08.2001 
Taloussanomat Sonera lyhentää jättivelkaansa suunnatulla osakeannilla 23.10.2001 
Taloussanomat Sonera pudotti Saksan umts-lisenssin arvon nollaan 26.07.2002 
??
APPENDIX 4. 
The table expresses the report length, the relative length of future prospects section as percentage of report length, the amount of different causal 
statement levels, and the relative amount of causal statements as percentage of the report length. 
 
Disclosure Report length 
Relative length of 
future prospects 
section 
Level 1  
Internal 
Level 1  
External 
Level 2 
Internal 
Level 2 
External 
Causal statements 
in total 
% of causal 
statements 
Q2 1999 57 7.02% 10 4     14 24.56% 
Q3 1999 71 7.04% 10 6   1 17 23.94% 
Year-end 1999 92 8.70% 23 11     34 36.96% 
Q1 2000 63 11.11% 10 5 1   16 25.40% 
Q2 2000 86 11.63% 14 4     18 20.93% 
Q3 2000 96 8.33% 15 2 1   18 18.75% 
Year-end 2000 102 5.88% 14 2     16 15.69% 
Q1 2001 56 7.14% 10 2     12 21.43% 
Q2 2001 52 7.69% 6 3     9 17.31% 
Q3 2001 59 10.17% 8 4   1 13 22.03% 
Year-end 2001 90 6.67% 11 7     18 20.00% 
Q1 2002 78 7.69% 15 5   1 21 26.92% 
Q2 2002 94 6.38% 20 7 1   28 29.79% 
Q3 2002 90 11.11% 17 4     21 23.33% 
Mean 78 8.33%     18 23.36% 
Median 82 7.69%     18 22.68% 
 
 
 
